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The Right to Be Hurt. Testing the Boundaries
of Consent.
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
People’s right to consent to pain, injury or death has always been one of the most
controversial issues in criminal law and moral philosophy. In recent years, that
issue has moved to the forefront of public, legislative, and academic debates in
the United States and abroad due to a series of high-profile criminal trials, which
involved consenting victims in various contexts–from sadomasochism and canni-
balism to experimental medical treatment and mercy killing.
Currently, American criminal law does not recognize consent of the victim as
a defense to bodily harm, except in a few historically defined circumstances. That
rule has been criticized for its arbitrary scope, outdated rationales, and potential
for moralistic manipulation. Yet, despite those criticisms, no principled alterna-
tive has been worked out. This article is an attempt to develop a set of normative
requirements for a new rule governing consensual bodily harm and a general de-
fense of consent.
The new rule would treat valid (voluntary and rational) consent of the victim as
a defense of partial or complete justification. Partial justification is warranted
by the mere fact that consensual harm does not involve at least one aspect of a
paradigmatic offense, namely a rights violation. The victim was a “co-author”
of his own injury and thus the perpetrator should not bear full responsibility for
it. Complete justification, on the other hand, would require that, in addition to
the victim’s consent, the perpetrator had a ”good reason” for his harmful action:
he intended to achieve a better balance of harms/evils and benefits and, in fact,
managed to achieve it. This article rejects the absolute character of today’s law.
Instead, it promotes a balancing test that takes into account the severity of harm
to the victim’s interests and dignity as well as the importance of the reasons that
caused the harmful act.
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2INTRODUCTION 
 
In late 2000, Armin Meiwes, a 42-year-old German computer technician, posted a 
message in an Internet chat room devoted to cannibalism:  “Seeking well-built man, 18-
30 years old, for slaughter.”1 A few months later, Bernd Juergen Brandes, a 43-year-old 
German microchip engineer, replied:  “I offer myself to you and will let you dine from 
my live body.  No butchery, dining!!”2
The two men exchanged numerous e-mails, discussing details of the prospective 
killing and dining. Brandes even joked about their both being smokers: “Good, smoked 
meat lasts longer.”3 On March 9, 2001, Brandes arrived at Meiwes’s place.   
Brandes swallowed 20 sleeping tablets and half a bottle of schnapps.  Then 
Meiwes cut off part of his body and fried it as a snack for them both.  Brandes 
was bleeding to death, but still not dead when Meiwes stabbed him in the neck 
after a goodbye kiss.  Then Meiwes butchered him and froze the flesh.  Eventually 
he ate about 20kg, washing it down with a South African red.4
At his trial, Meiwes admitted to killing, dismembering and eating Brandes.  His 
principal defense was the victim’s consent.  Meiwes was convicted of manslaughter and 
sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in prison.  The three-judge German court rejected the 
prosecution’s plea for a murder on the grounds that Meiwes had followed the victim’s 
instructions.5 Both the prosecution and the defense appealed the verdict, and the Federal 
 
1 Peter Finn, Cannibal Case Grips Germany; Suspect Says Internet Correspondent Volunteered to Die, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 4, 2003, at A26. 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 Michael Cook, Moral Mayhem of Murder on the Menu, HERALD SUN (MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA), January 
15, 2004, at 17. 
 
4 Id. 
 
5 Mark Landler, Cannibal Convicted of Manslaughter; German Court Orders an 8 1/2-year Sentence, THE 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 31, 2004, at 3.  Explaining the verdict, the judge said:  “This was 
an act between two extremely disturbed people who both wanted something from each other.”  Id. For the 
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3Constitutional Court, Germany’s highest criminal court, ordered a retrial, saying that 
Meiwes’s manslaughter conviction was too lenient.  In May 2006, Meiwes was convicted 
of murder and sentenced to life in prison.6
The story attracted enormous publicity, both in Germany and abroad.  In its 
macabre way, it raised some of the most fundamental questions of law and morality:  
what are the legal and moral effects of consent?  Does one have an unlimited right to 
authorize another person to hurt him?  Should the state prosecute a private wrongdoing 
between two legally competent, consenting adults?  And if so, on what grounds? 
These theoretical issues are in the middle of political, public, and academic 
debates in a number of countries.  Only a few years earlier, the Law Commission for 
England and Wales issued two consultation papers that analyzed the law of consent and 
called for its reform.7 The event that prompted the work of the Commission was a 
controversial and very high-profile police investigation into the activities of a group of 
men involved in consensual sadomasochistic activities.8 The investigation ended in a 
criminal prosecution and conviction of the defendants.9 The case, R. v. Brown, was 
 
legal opinion, see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 26, 2004, 49 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 166 (F.R.G.), available at 
http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de using Aktenzeichen: 2 StR 505/03. 
 
6 See Cannibal guilty of murder, gets life sentence, May 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/09/cannibal.trial.ap/index.html.
7 Consent and Offenses against the Person, Law Commission Consultation Paper, No 134 (1994) 
[hereinafter LCC 1994 Paper]; Consent in the Criminal Law, Law Commission Consultation Paper Part 10,
No 139 at 10.1 (1995) [hereinafter LCC 1995 Paper ]. 
 
8 See Paul Roberts, Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English 
Experiences of Criminal Law Reform 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 173, 210 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts].  Paul 
Roberts served as a consultant to the Law Commission for England and Wales [hereinafter the 
Commission]. 
 
9 See R v. Brown, [1992] 2 All E.R. 552 (Eng. C.A.). 
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4appealed first to the House of Lords and then to the European Court for Human Rights; 
both appeals failed as the courts refused to expand an individual’s power to consent to 
injury beyond trivial harm and a few narrowly defined circumstances.10 
The court decisions in Brown provoked numerous discussions and publications, 
most of which were critical of the judicial reasoning and the outcome of the case.  In the 
words of the Commission, Brown “cast fresh light on the unprincipled way in which [the 
rules of consent] had developed, and revealed considerable disagreement about the basis 
and policy of the present law, its detailed limits and its scope for future development.”11 
The Commission has assembled and analyzed numerous cases, attempting to develop 
general principles of the law of consent but the attempt proved to be largely 
unsuccessful.12 No final Report with legislative recommendations was issued and no 
reforms followed.13 Eventually, in 2001, the Commission admitted its inability to reach 
consensus and terminated the consent project.14 
10 See R v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (H.L.).  See also Roberts, supra note 8, at 210-11.  Describing 
procedural history of the case, Roberts wrote: 
Their first appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal, and their convictions were subsequently 
upheld, by the narrowest margin of three votes to two, in the House of Lords.  With all domestic 
remedies exhausted, the way was open to launch a complaint to the European Court of Human 
Rights . . .. But in a disappointing, poorly argued judgment, the Strasbourg Court simply endorsed 
the reasoning of the majority in the House of Lords, and unanimously rejected the applicants' 
complaint.   
Id.
11 LCC 1995 Paper, supra note 7, at 1. 
 
12 Roberts, supra note 8, at 248 (observing that “the consent project has not been amongst the 
Commission’s most conspicuous successes.”) 
 
13 Id. at 233. 
 
14 See Law Commission 274, Eighth Programme of Law Reform 44 (2001). 
The responses to the consultation papers were highly polarised, particularly on the issue of consent 
for non-sexual offences, and no consensus emerged. Bearing in mind the matters we have already 
reported on, the amount of work that would be required to reach conclusions on the very difficult 
and sensitive issues involved, and the urgency attaching to our other work, we have decided it 
would not be worthwhile for us to produce any further report on this topic. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art37
5Other countries have been struggling with the issue of consent as well, its 
application ranging from body piercing to sexual violence15 to assisted suicide.16 The 
legislative and public interest in the defense of consent is understandable.  The ability to 
consent is recognized in moral philosophy as a central manifestation of personhood and 
individual autonomy.17 Modern political theory sees the only source of legitimacy of the 
state power in the “consent of the governed.”18 In contrast, today’s criminal law extends 
to an individual very limited authority to consent as far as his physical wellbeing is 
concerned.  The rules governing individuals’ ability to consent to bodily harm are not 
merely strict; they are morally and conceptually incoherent.  These rules need to be 
reexamined and revised to reflect the values of autonomy and dignity essential in a 
democratic society.  It has been accurately observed that “American criminal law has yet 
to appreciate fully the central significance of the consent defense.”19 
Questions that I raise in this Article do not yield easy answers.  The central ones 
among them are:  why does consent negate criminal harm in some but not all instances, 
and when should consensual death or injury be legitimate? Despite many excellent works 
 
Id. 
15 See, e.g., Ian Freckelton, Masochism, Self-Mutilation and the Limits of Consent, 2 J. L. AND MED. 48, 
(1994) (analyzing the law of consent in New Zealand and Australia and opining that it remains unclear in 
the wake of R. v. Brown). 
 
16 Michael Cormack, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in the Post-Rodriguez Era: Lessons from Foreign 
Jurisdictions, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 591, 598-99 (2000) (outlining legislative struggle in Canada around 
the issue of assisted suicide in the past two decades). 
 
17 See, e.g., Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996). 
 
18 See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 509, 569 (2004). 
 
19 Id. at 509. 
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6about consent published in recent years,20 those questions remain largely unresolved.  
The goal of this Article is to put forward a theory that might explain the treatment of 
consensual bodily harm in law and morality, and to outline a set of normative 
requirements for a general defense of consent. 
I start this Article with an analysis of the current U.S. law of consent – what it 
says,21 how it is applied,22 and what rationales for the law are usually given by the 
legislature, courts and commentators.23 When this analysis does not produce sufficiently 
coherent answers, I proceed to explore the role of consent with respect to various 
offenses and conclude that, conceptually, consensual infliction of bodily harm differs 
from other consensual acts.  In most instances, the role of consent is inculpatory, i.e. 
consent defeats even a prima facie harm.  Consensual sex is not rape, consensual 
possession of other people’s belongings is not theft, and consensual presence on other 
people’s premises is not trespass.  In contrast, the role of consent in cases of bodily harm 
is exculpatory: consensual injury or death is still regrettable, even when morally or 
legally justified.24 
20 See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989); PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT (2003); 
Kenneth W. Simons, “The Conceptual Structure of Consent in Criminal Law,” Buff. Crim. L. Rev. (2006); 
LCC 1994 Paper, supra note 7; LCC 1995 Paper, supra note 7; Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of 
Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996); Hurd, supra note 17; Roberts, supra note 8;  Kenneth W. 
Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV.
213 (1987), and R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-
Coercively, 75 B.U.L. REV. 1397 (1995).  In addition, for discussion of consent in a larger context see, e.g., 
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986)[hereinafter HARM TO SELF];  MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 
(1997) [hereinafter MOORE]; GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 705 (1986) [hereinafter 
FLETCHER]; Dubber, supra note 18; and R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L.REV. 13 (2001). 
 
21 See discussion infra Section I.B.
22 See discussion infra Section I.C.
23 See discussion infra Section I.D.
24 See discussion infra Section II.A.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art37
7The fact that it is regrettable leads me to reexamine the traditional meaning of 
harm, which is usually understood as violation of rights.  Yet, if harm were only violation 
of rights, then consent, being a waiver of rights, would defeat it.  Like a few other 
scholars, I conclude that we need a broader theory of harm and wrongfulness not limited 
to the violation of one’s rights but encompassing other aspects of people’s humanity as 
well, first and foremost human dignity.  In this broader sense, a wrongful interference 
with one’s interests includes not merely violation of one’s autonomy but also violation of 
one’s dignity.25 
This conclusion has two normative consequences.  One is that consent should 
always be at least a partial defense, since it defeats at least one aspect of harm, namely 
violation of rights.26 The other conclusion is that consent alone does not suffice to justify 
bodily harm.  To qualify for a full defense, the perpetrator must establish that he did not 
wrongfully interfere with the victim’s wellbeing, i.e. that the consensual harmful act 
either did not significantly set back the victim’s interests or did not disregard the victim’s 
dignity.   
Like other justification defenses, the defense of consent requires that the harmful 
act produce a positive “balance of evils” and that the perpetrator intend that outcome 
while causing harm.27 The latter requirement is mandated by the fact that consent of the 
victim does not impose on the perpetrator an obligation to act.  As a free moral agent, the 
perpetrator needs a good-faith belief in the justifiability of interfering with another 
 
25 See discussion infra Section II.B.
26 See discussion infra Section II.C.
27 See discussion infra Section II.D.
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8person’s physical wellbeing.  In other words, both objectively and subjectively, the 
perpetrator’s reasons for the injurious act must (i) be overall benevolent and (ii) negate 
harm either to the victim’s interests or to his dignity. 
This Article rejects the current dividing line between permissive and 
impermissive consensual harm based on the amount of injury and a few historically 
recognized exceptions.  It also rejects the absolute character of today’s law.  Instead, it 
promotes a balancing test that takes into account the seriousness of the interference with 
the victim’s interests and dignity, on the one hand, and the seriousness of the 
perpetrator’s reasons for the harmful action, on the other.  These considerations should 
guide policymakers and judges in their decisions, including those involving euthanasia, 
experimental medical treatment and unconventional sex. 
This Article begins a larger project related to the issues of consent and harm in 
criminal law.  For now, unless specified otherwise, I limit my inquiry to a “perfect” case 
involving informed consent explicitly and voluntarily given by one adult rational 
individual to another, and a harmful action that takes place in private and does not exceed 
the boundaries of such consent.   
I.      THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF CONSENT 
 
A.   Development of the Volenti Principle. 
 
The principle underlying the defense of consent, volenti non fit injuria was 
recognized in Roman law as early as the 6th century.28 The first reported case in England 
 
28 Volenti non fit injuria means “no wrong is done to one who consents.”  See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).  See also Terence Ingman, A History of the Defense of Volenti Non Fit 
Injuria, 26 JURID. REV. 2 (1981) (discussing the application of the principle in Justinian’s Codex (529 
A.D.) and Justinian’s Digest (533 A.D.)). 
 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art37
9in which the volenti rule was mentioned dates back to the beginning of the 14th century.29 
By the 17th century, volenti has been established as a “maxim.”30 In “Maxims of Reason:  
Or, the Reason of the Common Law of England,” it is said that a person invited into a 
house to dine is not a trespasser for “volenti non fit injuria.”31 
Originally, consent was viewed as a complete ban on prosecution.  A person was 
free to consent to practically anything.  As a 14th century case said, “the law will suffer a 
man of his own folly to bind himself to pay on a certain day if he does not make the 
Tower of London come to Westminster. ‘Volenti non fit iniuria.’”32 
Changes in the power of an individual to consent to personal harm came in the 
17th century.  They were a natural consequence of the monopolization of the system of 
punishment by the state.  While in the early ages of criminal justice the victim was the 
central figure in the prosecution and settlement of any non-public offense,33 in the 
normative and centralized judicial structure the victim became almost entirely excluded 
from the criminal process.34 “In contrast to the understanding of crime as a violation of 
 
29 Randolf v. de Richmond (1304) Y.B. Edw. 1, reprinted in ED. HORWOOD, at 6-10 (1956).  In that case, 
Walter Randolf complained that John de Richmond has tortiously taken his beasts.  The defendant replied 
that he had a right to take them since they were on his land.  And in the course of the argument one Hunt 
reportedly said:  “Nay, volenti non fit iniuria.”  See Ingman, supra note 28, at 2-3. 
 
30 EDMOND WINGATE, MAXIMS OF REASON: OR, THE REASON OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 482 
(1658) cited in Ingman, supra note 28, at 4. 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 3.  Interestingly, this general principle has determined the outcome of the case although it was in 
direct conflict with the “written law,” which provided for an excuse of impracticability to a breach of 
contract (“Nemo obligatur ad impossible”). 
 
33 See HARRY ELMER BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 342 (2nd ed. 1951) 
(explaining that public offenses were those that exposed a “group to spiritual or human enemies, 
particularly the former”).  “Crimes against persons were not controlled by the tribe or the family but by the 
clan under the principle of blood feud.” Id. 
34 Clarence Ray Jeffery, Crime in Early English Society, 47 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCI.
647, 662 (1957) (“By 1226 an agreement between the criminal and the relatives of a slain man would not 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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the victim’s interest, the emergence of the state developed another interpretation:  the 
disturbance of the society.”35 An increasing number of historically “private” offenses 
were reconceptualized as “public.”36 The state (or king) became the ultimate victim and 
the sole prosecutor of a criminal act.  As a result, an individual has lost the power to 
consent to what the state regarded as harm to itself.       
In Matthew v. Ollerton, decided in the late 17th century, counsel argued that the 
victim’s consent is not a defense to assault and battery:  “If I licence a man to beat me, 
such licence is void.”37 The court agreed – “because it’s against the peace.”38 The new 
rule was followed.  Fifty years later, a court said that consent of the victim to participate 
in an unlawful fight does not bar his action.39 Similar considerations determined the 
adjudication of the Wright’s Case, which involved the offense of mayhem.  In that often 
cited early 17th century case, a man asked his friend to cut off his hand, so that he would 
have “more colour to begge.”40 The consent of the victim did not exculpate the 
perpetrator because, by “violently depriving another of the use of such of his members as 
 
avail to save the murderer from an indictment and a sentence of death.  The state no longer allowed a 
private settlement of a criminal case.”). 
 
35 STEPHEN SCHAFER, VICTIMOLOGY: VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 22 (1977).  
 
36 By the 18th century, all crimes and misdemeanors were regarded as public wrongs.  See 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *5 (explaining that “public wrongs, or crimes 
and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community”). 
 
37 Matthew v. Ollerton (1692) Comb. 218, 90 E.R. 438, cited in Ingman, supra note 28, at 4. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Boulter v. Clark (1747) Bull. N.P. 16, cited in Ingman, supra note 28, at 4-5.  The distinction between 
criminal law and torts was not solidified until the 19th century.  See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on 
the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970) (“[A]ny 
distinction between crime and tort was unknown.”). 
 
40 R. v. Wright, 1 Coke on Littleton #194 (127a, 127b); 1 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The 
History of the Pleas of the Crown 412 (1736). 
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may render him less able in fighting, either to defend himself, or to annoy his adversary,” 
he had deprived the king of the aid and assistance of one of his subjects.41 
The law of consent has undergone little change since the 17th century.  In the 
following three sections, I explore its meaning in today’s legal theory and practice:  what 
the law says; how courts apply it; and what rationales judges most commonly cite in 
support of their decisions. 
 B.  What Does the U.S. Law Say? 
 
American law of consent is far from being clear.  On the one hand, it is widely 
recognized that consent of the victim is not a defense in criminal prosecution.42 On the 
other hand, it is equally widely recognized that consent may completely exculpate a 
nominally proscribed act.  
What is called a “fond embrace” when gladly accepted by a sweetheart is called 
assault and battery when forced upon another without her consent; the act of one 
who grabs another by the ankles and causes him to fall violently to the ground 
may result in a substantial jail sentence under some circumstances, but receives 
thunderous applause if it stops a ball carrier on the grid-iron.43 
Under the Model Penal Code, consent is a defense if it “negatives an element of 
the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the 
 
41 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, * 205.  
 
42 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 360 (4th ed. 2003). 
 
43 ROLLIN PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 962 (2d ed. 1969). 
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law defining the offense.”44 Accordingly, valid consent precludes rape, kidnapping, theft, 
burglary and many other serious crimes, which are premised on the lack of consent.45 
However, this general rule is of limited use in the area of offenses involving 
bodily harm.  Section 2.11(2) invalidates one’s consent to personal harm in all but three 
sets of circumstances:  one, when the injury is not serious;46 two, when the injury or its 
risk are reasonably foreseeable hazards of participation in a “lawful athletic contest or 
competitive sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law;”47 and three, when the 
consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the MPC.48 
Unfortunately, this definition, which reflects the law in the absolute majority of 
states,49 does not give much practical guidance.  What harm is not serious?  What 
 
44 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter MPC] 
(providing that consent is a defense “if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the 
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense). 
 
45 See id. at cmt. 1 (noting that, for many crimes, including rape, false imprisonment and criminal trespass, 
“it is essential to the commission of the crime that there be an unwilling victim of the actor’s conduct”).  
See also LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 147 (1996) (“If consented-to, the taking isn’t theft, the intercourse 
isn’t rape, the tackling isn’t battery, even the killing may not be murder.”).   
 
46 MPC § 2.11(2)(a). 
 
47 MPC § 2.11(2)(b). 
 
48 MPC § 2.11(2)(c).  See also MPC, § 2.11, cmt. 2.  Article 3 of the MPC is entitled General Principles of 
Justification. 
 
49 Thirteen states explicitly recognize a general defense of consent in their statutes.  See ALA.CODE § 13A-
2-7; COLO. REV. STAT § 18-1-505; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11 §§ 451-453; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-233-
235 (omits equivalent of Subsection (2)(a)); ME REV. STAT. ANN.. tit. 17-A, § 55 (omits equivalent of 
Subsection (3)(c));  N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (omits equivalent of Subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d)); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (omits equivalent of Subsection (3)(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08; PA. CONST 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 311 (omits equivalent of Subsection (2)(a)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 263, § 42; MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 330 (omitted from Mich. (p) S.B. 82); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12.9; VT. STAT. ANN. § 1.2.7; W. 
VA. CODE § 61-2-10. 
Other states have incorporated the concept of consent in the Special Part of their penal codes, making non- 
consent an element of an offense or providing for the defense of consent with respect to specific crimes.  
See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17. (“It shall be a defense to any offense under Section 12-13 through 12-
16 of this Code [sexual crimes] where force or threat of force is an element of the offense that the victim 
consented.”).  Where the statute does not explicitly mention consent, case law usually defines in what 
circumstances consent may function as a defense. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (“An assault is an 
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”); and 
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harmful “concerted activities” are “not forbidden by law”?  And in what circumstances 
does consent establish a justification for nominally criminal conduct under Article 3 of 
the MPC?  The following section addresses these issues. 
 C. What Does the Rule Mean Literally? 
 
1.  What harm is “not serious”? 
 
The Official Commentary to the MPC explains that Section 2.11(2) reflects 
traditional reluctance of the law to recognize consent as a defense to bodily injury.  The 
illustration of permissible non-serious injury offered in the commentary is an 
“overenthusiastic embrace.”50 If that example is what the drafters truly had in mind when 
they made allowance for a non-serious injury, this provision may be rather redundant.  
Section 2.12 already directs the court to dismiss prosecution if the perpetrator “did not 
actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of 
conviction.”51 
However, if the drafters intended anything beyond a trivial injury to be lawful, 
they did little to define the permissible boundaries.  The existing rules are often puzzling 
as to why the line between the lawful and unlawful conduct was drawn where it was.  For 
example, shortening one’s toes is so far quite lawful, and a growing number of 
fashionistas undergo the surgery in order to fit into stylish pointy-toed shoes.52 Yet, if the 
 
People v. Gordon, 11 P. 762, 762 (Cal. 1886)  (“An attempt made with the victim’s consent will not 
constitute an assault.”) Id. 
50 MPC § 2.11, cmt. 2 at 396. 
 
51 MPC § 2.12(2). 
 
52 Dawn Fallik, High heels might look great but can put feet in ugly state, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE 
(Georgia) May 29, 2005. 
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same people wanted to cut off their fingers instead of toes, the legal outcome would 
likely be totally different.53 One might say that the discrepancy is historically determined 
by the impact of the injury on people’s ability to fight.  This rationale, however, is not 
only entirely outdated today54 but it also does not explain many other similar laws, for 
instance, why some states criminalize tongue splitting. 55 
Naturally, the meaning of “serious harm” has been changing over time.  In the 
early days of the common law, the Digest of the Criminal Law enunciated the following 
rule:  “Everyone has a right to consent to the infliction upon himself of bodily harm not 
amounting to a maim.”56 According to Blackstone,  
[T]he cutting off, or disabling, or weakening a man's hand or finger, or striking 
out his eye or foretooth, or depriving him of those parts, the loss of which in all 
animals abate their courage, are held to be mayhems. But the cutting off his ear, 
or nose, or the like, are not held to be mayhems at common law; because they do 
not weaken but only disfigure him.57 
Today’s penal statutes define serious harm as a “bodily injury which creates a 
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted 
 
53 State v. Bass, 120 S.E. 2d 580, 588 (N.C. 1961) (holding that consent of the victim to maiming, 
specifically cutting off fingers, is invalid).  
 
54 See, e.g., R. v. Brown, (1994) 1 A.C. 212 (Lord Mustill’s opinion). 
 
55 11 DEL. CODE. ANN. § 1114A (2005), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-10.2; N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
§ 470 (2005); TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE. ANN § 146.0126. 
 
56 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 141-42 (3rd ed. 1883).  That proposition was 
reprinted verbatim in “A Digest of the Criminal Law of Canada”, which provided illustrations:  it is a maim 
to strike out a front tooth; it is not a maim to cut off a man’s nose; and castration is a maim.  See GEORGE 
WHEELOCK, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CANADA Art. 262, at 199 (Carswell 1890). 
 
57 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36* 206.  Modern statutes define mayhem more broadly.  See, e.g., CAL CODE,
PENAL  § 220 (“Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his 
body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits 
the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.”). 
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loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”58 As this definition 
indicates, “serious harm” may be deemed to result from two kinds of actions – those that 
have caused permanent debilitating injuries and those that caused any bodily injury, if 
such injury creates a “substantial risk of death.”  The second category leaves so much 
room for interpretation that courts often inflate the risk of death to denounce an unwanted 
activity.    
For example, in In re J. A. P., a group of eighth graders played the game of 
“passout,” the object of which is for one player to make a fellow player faint.59 The 
defendant grabbed his friend around the neck and proceeded to choke him for a few 
seconds until that boy lost consciousness and fell on the ground. The victim suffered a 
few facial lacerations and chipped teeth.  By the time of the trial, all his injuries had been 
treated and healed.  Nevertheless, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault, 
an offense which required finding of “serious bodily harm.”   
The J. A. P court opined that, in determining whether the evidence supports a 
finding of such harm, “the relevant issue is the quality of the injury as it was inflicted, not 
after the effects are ameliorated by medical treatment.”60 The court concluded that a 
rational juror could determine that the act of choking presented a substantial risk of death; 
thus “serious harm” element of the charged offense was established.  Accordingly, since 
one may not give valid consent to “serious harm,” whether or not the victim had 
 
58 MPC § 210.0(3).  Following the MPC, many states have adopted an identical or similar definition.  See 
e.g., N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-1(b) (2005); Tex. Penal Code § 1.07  (2005). 
 
59 In re J.A.P., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 7374, *10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 
60 Id. at *10 (quoting Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). 
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consented to the choking was irrelevant for the defendant’s liability.61 What the court 
apparently overlooked is that, under the state law, a “serious injury” was defined as an 
injury that created a substantial risk of death, not merely an activity that created such a 
risk.62 Otherwise, following the court’s logic, a driver who exceeded the speed limit and 
was stopped by the police before he had a chance to get into any accident would be 
automatically guilty of causing serious injuries to his passengers even though none of 
them have suffered a scratch.   
In one particular context, courts have managed to find “serious harm” in virtually 
every single case, irrespectively of the extent of injuries.  Those are cases arising out of 
consensual sadomasochistic sexual activities.  Examples include encounters during which 
one of the participants was beaten with a belt63 or a riding crop64 or cut, burned, stabbed 
and dragged by the hair.65 In none of those cases did the consenting victim suffer a 
permanent debilitating injury or run a “substantial risk of death.” 
As the MPC Commentary acknowledges, the “iniquity of the conduct involved” 
tends to affect judicial assessment of the seriousness of the harm.66 In Iowa v. Collier,
for instance, the victim’s injuries consisted of “a swollen lip, large welts on her ankles, 
 
61 Id.   
 
62 Id. at *10 (quoting § 1.07(a)(46) of Texas Penal Code, which defines serious bodily injury as “injury that 
creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ”). 
 
63 See Iowa v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). 
 
64 See Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 1980). 
 
65 United States v. Arab, 55 M.J. 508, 513 (U.S. Army Ct. Crim. App. 2001). 
 
66 MPC § 2.11 cmt. 2 at note 8.  The Commentary points out that the MPC provision does not explicitly 
foreclose resort to such judgments though the envisioned emphasis is on the amount of injury itself.  Id.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art37
17
wrists, hips, buttocks, and severe bruises on her thighs.”67 The defendant was convicted 
of assault resulting in a serious injury, and the appellate court agreed, although, as the 
dissenting judge has pointed out, the inflicted bodily harm did not constitute a serious 
injury within the meaning of the state statute.68 
Some state penal codes include physical pain in the definition of “bodily harm.”69 
In Washington v. Guinn,70 for example, the defendant was convicted of inflicting “serious 
physical injury” in the course of a sexual encounter.  There was no evidence that the 
victim “ever required any medical attention or suffered any wounds of any sort.”71 Yet 
the appellate court sustained the assault conviction, reasoning that the sadomasochistic 
paraphernalia used by the defendant must have caused serious physical pain (candle wax 
was “hot and stung” and nipple clamps were “tight and cutting”),72 and “serious physical 
 
67 Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 304.  See also R. v. Donovan (1934) 2 K.B. 498, 503 (“seven or eight red marks” 
on the body of a participant of a sadomasochistic encounter found to be sufficient for an assault 
conviction); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA Crim 1710 (bloodshot eyes and a burn, which has completely 
healed by the time of the trial, sufficed for an assault conviction of a participant of consensual 
sadomasochistic sex). 
 
68 Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 304.  In addition, courts may impose criminal punishment for consensual bodily 
harm even when the relevant statute does not require the finding of a “serious” injury.  For an implicite 
revision of this rule, see People v. Jovanovic, 263 A.D.2d 182, 197, n. 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (declaring 
that consent of the victim may not serve as a defense to assault, yet at the same time reversing the 
defendant’s conviction of assault in the second degree and third degree because the trial judge improperly 
excluded evidence indicating the victim’s consent).  But see id. at 206-07 (Mazzarelli, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (pointing out that court decision goes against the rule adopted in the majority of 
jurisdictions). 
 
69 See, e.g., MPC § 2.10.0(2); WASH. REV. CODE  § 9A.04.110(4)(a) (“‘Bodily injury,’ ‘physical injury,’ or 
‘bodily harm’ means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition.”). 
 
70 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 502 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 2, March 30, 2001). 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at *34. 
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pain” satisfied the definition of “serious bodily injury.”73 Naturally, under a statute of 
this type, practically any sadomasochistic activity automatically qualifies as criminal. 
 In sum, courts commonly exaggerate the seriousness of injury or pain and the risk 
of harm in order to condemn an unwanted activity.  Like in other instances when an 
argument is used not for what it stands but as a proxy for an unspoken consideration, 
these decisions frequently reveal conceptual manipulation and poor reasoning.      
 2. What harmful “concerted activities” are “not forbidden by law”? 
 
Originally, Section 2.11(2)(b) recognized consent as a defense for the harmful 
conduct of the perpetrator and bodily injuries to the victim only when those were 
“reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or 
competitive sport.”74 In 1962, this provision was expanded to add at the end “or other 
concerted activity not forbidden by law.”  According to an MPC commentary and 
materials of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) proceedings, the new language was 
intended to cover activities that are “more appropriately characterized as exhibitions than 
as sports or athletic contests.”75 But did the drafters intend to limit “other concerted 
activities not forbidden by law” only to exhibitions?  The ALI reporters explicitly 
excluded certain activities, such as a duel76 or a scuffle,77 from the protection of new 
 
73 Id. 
 
74 MPC § 2.11(2)(b). 
 
75 Id. at 396-97; n. 10.  See also The American Law Institute, 39th Annual Meeting, Proceedings 92-104 
(1962) [hereinafter ALI Proceedings] (explaining that the new language is needed to permit activities like 
stunt flying or professional wrestling).  See also State v. Malone, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 901, *9-
10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated allows consent to serve as a defense 
only “within the context of sporting activities, and the like, in which two parties agree to engage in conduct 
where some contact is expected or anticipated”). 
 
76 ALI Proceedings, supra note 75, at 101. 
 
77 Id. at 101 and 104. 
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Section 2.11(2)(b).  It is likely, although not specifically provided, that other harmful 
hostile activities, such as hazing, are not covered by the revised section either.78 What is 
less clear is whether non-hostile consensual private encounters, such as religious 
mortification or sadomasochistic sex, may be entitled to legal protection under the MPC.   
Historically, courts have viewed religious flagellation as a lawful activity.79 In an 
1847 Scottish case, the court said:  “In some cases, a beating may be consented to as in 
the case of a father confessor ordering flagellation; but this is not violence or assault 
because there is consent.”80 The practice still exists in a number of nations with the 
strong Roman Catholic tradition.  The Philippines, for example, is famous for its bloody 
crucifixion re-enactment ceremonies that happen every year on Good Friday and attract 
large crowds of local and foreign tourists.81 Opus Dei, a conservative catholic 
movement, encourages “corporal mortification,” which can include flagellation done by 
another person.  Such acts are said to help bolster self-discipline and recall the suffering 
of Christ.82 
In the United States religious flagellation is practiced mainly in southwestern 
states.83 Although courts have said that the law may prohibit religiously impelled 
 
78 Frank J. Wozniak, Validity, Construction, and Application of “Hazing” Statutes, 30 A.L.R.5th 683. 
 
79 LCC Paper 1995 supra note 7, at 10.1. 
 
80 Id. at 130. (quoting William Fraser (1847) Ark 280, 302). 
 
81 See Ronald Hilton, Religion: Good Friday – Viernes Santo. The Philippines, April 4, 2001, available at 
http://wais.stanford.edu/Religion/religion_viernessantophilippines41401.html. 
 
82 See David Ruppe, Opus Dei on the Rise Conservative Catholic Group Grows Quietly (2001), available at 
http://www.greatdreams.com/sacred/Opus_Dei.html. 
 
83 See LCC 1995 Paper, supra note 7, at 130. 
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criminal attacks,84 my research has revealed no legal cases, which suggests that religious 
flagellation has not been subject to criminal prosecution.  Moreover, some states have 
statutes regulating ritual mutilation.  Illinois Criminal Code, for instance, provides that  
A person commits the offense of ritual mutilation, when he or she mutilates, 
dismembers or tortures another person as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, 
observance, performance or practice, and the victim did not consent or under 
such circumstances that the defendant knew or should have known that the 
victim was unable to render effective consent.85 
The italicized language indicates that, if the religious mutilation, dismemberment or 
torture is done with the consent of the victim, such activity should be lawful. 
At the same time, if the primary motive for the infliction of pain is not religious 
but sexual, the perpetrator is likely to be convicted of assault.86 Any attempts to present 
sadomasochistic sex as “other concerted activity” have failed.  In Collier, for example, 
the court held that the legislature did not intend to include sadomasochistic activity in the 
list of “sport, social or other activity” under Iowa Code. 87 
The discrepancy in the treatment of the two kinds of flagellation is disturbing:  in 
both instances the perpetrator may perform the exact same acts, with consent of the 
victim, and for the purpose of satisfying the emotional need of the victim.  Yet, if that 
emotional need has a sexual undertone, the perpetrator is likely to be convicted of a 
 
84 United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1496 (D. Wyo. 1995).  See also Ogletree v. State, 211 Ga. 
App. 845, 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (opining that, even had the victim consented, the severe beating ordered 
by a pastor would still constitute battery). 
 
85 720, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-32 (emphasis added). 
 
86 See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App.2d 501, 506-07 (Ca. 1967) (the Supreme Court of California 
ruling that “consent of the victim is not generally a defense to assault or battery, except in a situation 
involving ordinary physical contact or blows incident to sports such as football, boxing, or wrestling.”). 
 
87 See, e.g., Iowa v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). 
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felony.  It appears that this rule is a typical example of moral legislation intended to 
punish the perpetrator for causing a “wrong” kind of pleasure.     
 3.  What is a “recognized form of treatment”? 
 
Finally, consent may serve as a defense under Section 2.11(2)(c) if it “establishes 
a justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code.”88 In fact, there is only one 
provision in Article 3 that conditions justifiability of the actor’s conduct on another 
person’s consent.  That is Section 3.08(4) which provides that the use of force toward 
another is justifiable if the actor is a physician or his assistant and 
(a) the force is used for the purpose of administering a recognized form of 
treatment which the actor believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or 
mental health of the patient; and  
(b) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient . . .. 89 
Thus, under Section 2.11(2)(c), consent is a valid defense if the bodily harm was inflicted 
for the purpose of a “recognized form of treatment” intended to improve the patient’s 
physical or mental health. 
Just as it is not easy to define “non-serious” harm, it is hard to draw the line 
between recognized and experimental forms of treatment.90 Sometimes judicial 
characterization depends on the “regulatory status of a product or the novelty of a 
procedure, while in other instances an established product or procedure may be 
characterized as experimental simply because a research protocol aims to investigate its 
 
88 MPC § 2.11(2)(c). 
 
89 See MPC § 3.08. 
 
90 Ironically, the illustration of such “recognized form of treatment” offered during the discussion of the 
draft consent provision at the American Law Institute meeting was electric shock therapy in cases of 
“mental trouble.”  ALI Proceedings supra note 75, at 92. 
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use.”91 A few courts have invalidated as unconstitutionally vague state statutes, which 
criminalized certain medical procedures characterized as “experimental.”92 
Examples of what forms of treatment are currently considered “recognized” 
reveal the law’s inconsistency.  A woman who carries a breast cancer gene may choose to 
have a preventive mastectomy.93 Such radical surgery is considered to be controversial in 
medical literature:  there is little proof that, for purposes of cancer prevention, it is 
superior to less extreme and disfiguring alternatives.94 The main advantage of the 
surgery is that it helps to relieve symptoms of the “breast cancer syndrome,” a condition 
in which women experience stress and anxiety over the substantial likelihood of 
developing the disease.95 
Yet no amount of emotional pain legitimizes an elective surgery on a patient with 
the Body Integrity Identity Disorder (“BIID”), a rare ailment whose victims seek to 
become amputees.96 The limited statistics seem to indicate that, if they succeed in their 
pursuit, their quality of life improves dramatically.97 However, a surgeon who agrees to 
 
91 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental 
Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 377 (2002). 
 
92 See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1500-02 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grds., 518 U.S. 137 
(1996); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The whole distinction between 
experimentation and testing, or between research and practice is . . . almost meaningless in the medical 
context."); Lifechez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1364-66 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 
93 See e.g., Jane E. Brody, Why Cancer-Free Women Have Breasts Removed, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at 
C13. 
 
94 Lane D. Ziegler & Stephen S. Kroll, Primary Breast Cancer After Prophylactic Mastectomy, 14 AM. J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 451, 453 (1991) (discussing controversial nature of prophylactic mastectomy and 
comparing it with less radical alternatives). 
 
95 Id. at 452. 
 
96 Editorial, When it feels right to cut off your leg, GEELONG ADVERTISER 15 July 4, 2005. 
 
97 Id. 
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perform such an amputation opens himself up to criminal liability because his patients’ 
consent is legally invalid.98 The BIID patients often compare themselves to those 
suffering from Gender Identity Disorders (“GID”), describing the common experience as 
“being trapped in the wrong body.”99 The law, however, treats the two groups very 
differently:  the GID patients can give consent to a sex-change operation, which often 
involves removal of healthy sexual organs,100 whereas the BIID sufferers cannot give 
consent to amputation of an arm or a leg.101 
It remains somewhat unclear whether an individual can give consent to an 
experimental treatment that involves serious bodily harm or at least a risk of such harm.  
A commentary to Section 3.08 of the MPC provides:  “Whether and how far consent 
should be effective to exclude liability for forms of treatment that are not ‘recognized’ 
and that involve risk of death or injury is a problem covered as part of the general 
treatment of consent.”102 Since the consent section of the MPC generally does not allow 
for serious harm, it appears that, under the MPC, a patient may not give valid consent to 
 
98 See Neil Levy and Tim Bayne, Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of 
Amputation, 22 J. APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, 1, 75-86 (arguing that, as long as people are legally sane, they 
should be allowed to have their limbs amputated by a surgeon). 
 
99 Carl Elliot, A New Way to Be Mad, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2000. 
 
100 See G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (“The severity of the problem of trans-
sexualism becomes obvious when one contemplates the reality of the male transsexual’s desperate desire to 
have normally functioning male genitals removed because the male sex organs are a source of immense 
psychological distress.”).   
 
101 See Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-ethical Limits of Self-
Modification, 32 J.L. MED & ETHICS 148, 155 (2004) (“To the extent that society and its institution remain 
committed to a norm of bodily integrity that excludes the disabled body, it will remain very difficult to 
collectively imagine that elective amputation could be good medicine for apotemnophiles.”).   
 
102 MPC § 3.08, cmt. 5 at 144. 
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experimental treatment that involves a risk of a serious injury, even if the putative 
benefits significantly outweigh the risks. 
 D.  How Do Courts Apply the Rule? Rationales for Criminalization of Consensual  
 Harm. 
When the law is ambiguously written and inconsistently applied, one way to make 
sense of it is to look at the rationales permeating various court decisions.  These 
rationales are intended to justify the state’s interference with the right of an individual to 
make personal choices.  Quoting Paul Roberts, 
At the first stage, the advocate of any particular criminal prohibition needs to 
supply a good reason, not just for generalized state interference in the lives of 
individuals, but for that special form of state regulation represented by criminal 
sanctions: that is, hard treatment (with serious implications for personal 
autonomy) administered through procedures specially designed to communicate 
the sting of blame or “censure.”103 
Of course, state invalidation of an individual’s consent presents a problem only so 
far as consent is voluntary, i.e., freely given and informed.104 Consent obtained by duress 
or fraud regarding the nature of the perpetrator’s act is void ab initio.105 Certain groups 
of people (children, mentally ill, intoxicated) in most instances are deemed incapable of 
issuing valid consent.106 For example, minors’ consent to sex is legally invalid.107 
103 Roberts, supra note 8, at 217 (2001). 
 
104 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 20, at 166 (1996) (observing that, to be able to give valid consent, one 
must be of a certain age, lack serious mental disease, irrationality or intoxication, and have a certain 
minimum degree of self-control). 
 
105 W. E. Shipley, Consent as Defense to Charge of Criminal Assault and Battery, 58 A.L.R.3d 662 § 4 
(2005) (observing that consent obtained by fraud, or from one without capacity to consent, will not be a 
defense to a charge of criminal assault and battery).  
 
105 HARM TO SELF, supra note 20, at 316. (“If he is so impaired or undeveloped cognitively that he doesn’t 
really know what he is doing, or so impaired or undeveloped volitionally that he cannot help what he is 
doing, then no matter what expression of assent he may give, it will lack the effect of genuine consent.”). 
 
107 See,e.g., MPC § 213.1 cmt. 6 (explaining that pre-pubescent children “are plainly incapable of giving 
any kind of meaningful consent to intercourse and manifestly inappropriate objects of sexual 
gratification”). 
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Thus, if there is a problem with the quality of consent or the decision-making 
power of the consenter, the court should declare the consent null and void.  Such decision 
enforces rather than impedes the victim’s autonomy.108 In contrast, paternalistic 
disregard of private arrangements made by fully responsible agents encroaches upon 
personal autonomy, which, at least in the liberal tradition, is believed to be essential for a 
free society.109 
For that reason, courts and policymakers have proposed various non-paternalistic 
rationales for invalidating one’s consent to personal harm.  The most common of them 
can be organized around two considerations – “harm to self,” and “harm to others.”  The 
first theory presumes that the apparent consent was not truly voluntary and rational and, 
therefore, is invalid.  The second maintains that, unless the consensual injurious act is 
prohibited, society will suffer significant harm.    
 1. Harm to Self:  Victim’s Apparent Consent Is Legally Invalid. 
 a.  The Victim Was Not Rational. 
From time to time, courts deny the validity of factual consent, arguing that it was 
irrational or involuntary.  In People v. Samuels,110 for example, the defendant was 
 
108 People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 750-51 (Mich. 1994) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Where an otherwise healthy person is depressed or mentally disturbed, the personal liberty 
interest is weak, and the state has a strong interest in protecting the person's interests in life.”). 
 
109 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. IV, ¶¶ 10-11 (New York 1869). Mill wrote: 
Whenever . . . there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to 
the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law. 
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury 
which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to 
the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the 
inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of 
human freedom. 
Id. 
110 250 Cal. App.2d 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
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convicted of aggravated assault for whipping an apparently willing victim in the course 
of production of a pornographic movie.  The case was complicated by the fact that the 
victim could not be found to confirm his consent.  However, the court dismissed the very 
possibility of such consent, saying:  “It is a matter of common knowledge that a normal 
person in full possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to the use, upon 
himself, of force likely to produce great bodily harm.”111 
The Samuels court’s argument is a perfect example of circular reasoning:  a 
person who consents to X is insane because one has to be insane to consent to X.  After 
the victim’s insanity is thus established, the conviction follows automatically because 
consent of an insane person is invalid.    
 It is easy to ridicule this logic.  Yet there are situations when almost anyone 
would wonder:  how rational was the victim when he consented to that kind of harm?  
For example, how rational was Brandes when he consented to being killed and eaten by 
Meiwes?  His consent to cutting off his penis some time before his death was hardly 
valid:  by that time Brandes had consumed 20 sleeping tablets and half a bottle of 
schnapps.112 But when he agreed to the killing, Brandes was not intoxicated.  He was 
informed of every detail of the plan and gave it his full approval, as a video made by 
Meiwes shows.113 Brandes was a mature man and an educated professional.  He was not 
 
111 Id. at 506-7. 
 
112 Luke Harding, Victim of cannibal agreed to be eaten, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, December 4, 2003, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,1099477,00.html.
113 Id. 
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clinically insane, although he apparently suffered from a “strong desire for self-
destruction.”114 
This story raises a question of whether the same level of rationality or 
competency should be required for effective consent to bodily harm of different 
proportions, e.g., rough sex on the one hand, and a radical surgery, on the other.115 The 
Brandes example also reveals the empirical fallacy of the a priori assumption that anyone 
who consents to pain or injury is crazy:  Brandes was not.  This is a disturbing thought.  
We can limit the defense of consent so as to require a written notarized request by the 
victim as well as the victim’s evaluation by several independent court-appointed 
psychiatrists, but sooner or later we are doomed to encounter a mentally competent 
person who would wish to be killed or injured.   
We may or may not sympathize with that wish.  For example, both doctors and 
laypeople have conflicting views on preventive mastectomy or physician-assisted suicide.  
However, unless we want the character of our society to change dramatically, we may not 
assert that a person is insane or irrational merely because we disagree with his decisions.  
Coordinating the required level of rationality with the amount (and kind) of the desired 
harm is likely to be a good practical solution for the absolute majority of problematic 
cases.  Still, with respect to the remaining small group of cases, in which rational people 
desire socially objectionable self-regarding harm, we would either have to permit the 
harm or find a better argument for prohibiting it.     
 
114 Id. 
 
115 See Alexander, supra note 21, at 167 (discussing similar issues). 
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 b. Consent Was Not Voluntary 
Some courts and commentators have expressed concern that, under certain 
circumstances, people may not act entirely voluntarily, even when they are not subject to 
formal duress or coercion.116 This, for example, was a matter that troubled the court in 
the Canadian case of R v. Carriere:
The consent in many of these “fair fights” with fists is often more apparent than 
real.  Challengers are, most often, those who feel assured that they can overwhelm 
opponents.  Those who accept the challenge often do so, not because they wish to 
fight, or truly consent to it, but because they fear being branded as cowards by 
their peers.117 
Similar issues have been raised in connection with the voluntariness of consent in 
the sadomasochistic context.  Lord Templeman in R. v Brown classified consent of the 
masochists in the group as “dubious or worthless,” suggesting that these individuals were 
younger than the men on the sadist side and psychologically vulnerable.   
But certainly the most serious concern about the rationality and voluntariness of 
consent arises in connection with assisted suicide and mercy killings.  It has been shown 
that those who attempt suicide usually suffer from depression or other mental 
disorders.118 Often people feel particularly vulnerable due to constant pain, and this 
 
116 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 20, at 1414-21 (1995) (discussing social, economic, and psychological 
considerations that can impair one’s freedom of choice); Simons, supra note 20, at 214 (advocating a 
change in the traditional tort doctrine of assumption of risk to reflect scope of information and choices 
available to an individual). 
 
117 R v. Carriere (1987), 35 CCC (3d) 276 at 286 (Alta Ca). 
 
118 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730 (1997).  The opinion cited the finding by the New York 
Task Force on Life and the Law that “more than 95% of those who commit suicide had a major psychiatric 
illness at the time of death.”  Id. 
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vulnerability may be exploited by others.119 Courts have been duly suspicious to the 
claims that a sick individual has voluntarily requested death.120 
In Gilbert v. State of Florida,121 the appellate court affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction of a first-degree murder for shooting his ill wife:  “It is ridiculous and 
dangerous to suggest that a constructive mercy will was left when the wife said ‘I am so 
sick I want to die.’  Such a holding would judicially sanction open season on people who, 
although sick, are also chronic complainers.”122 
The court was right to demand compelling evidence of the victim’s consent.  The 
legal system should guard people, especially those in a vulnerable position, from abuse.  
Just as with the requirement of rationality, the riskier the conduct and the more 
irrevocable the risked harm, the greater degree of voluntariness that should be required.123 
Particularly dangerous or irreparable decisions (e.g., consensual homicide) may even be 
presumed involuntary until proven otherwise.124 
119 See generally Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1996) (opposing euthanasia and physician 
assisted suicide both on moral and practical grounds).  The authors observe that “[i]llness is a quintessential 
state of vulnerability; it entails a loss of confidence in one’s body and one’s future.”  Id. at 28.  They also 
express concern that physicians may influence their patient’s choice.  Id. at 28-29. 
 
120 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (J. O’Connor concurring) (“The 
difficulty in defining terminal illness and the risk that a dying patient’s request for assistance in ending his 
or her life might not be truly voluntary justifies the prohibitions on assisted suicide.”). 
 
121 487 So. 2d 1185 (4th Dist. 1986). 
 
122 Id. at 1191. 
 
123 See HARM TO SELF, supra note 20, at 117-21. 
 
124 Id. at 124-27.  Feinberg wrote: 
In the cases of “presumably nonvoluntary behavior,” what we “presume” is either that that the actor 
is ignorant or mistaken about what he is doing, or acting under some sort of compulsion, or suffering 
from some sort of incapacity, and that if that were not the case, he would choose not to do what he 
seems bent on doing now. 
Id. at 124. 
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However, the fear of abuse may not be the basis of a rule prohibiting consensual 
harm altogether.  As I argued elsewhere,125 it is important to distinguish a rule from an 
abuse of that rule.  The abuse is something that is not the rule, something that is outside 
of the rule.  Practically anything, even a good thing, can be abused and turned into a bad 
thing, but this does not justify prohibiting the good thing itself.  Sexual abuse, for 
instance, is a bad thing, but we do not criminalize sex because of that.  In other words, 
when the reason for a criminal ban lies in an uncertainty regarding the validity 
(voluntariness and rationality) of an individual’s consent, the law should be directed at 
those uncertainties by demanding persuasive proof of the valid consent and not by taking 
away the power to give it.126 
c.  People Are Incapable of Rational Voluntary Consent. 
 Distinguished from the concerns about the validity of consent in specific 
circumstances should be a truly paternalistic argument that people are inherently 
incapable of rational and voluntary choices and thus should not be trusted to make 
important decisions about their lives.  That was, for instance, the position of H.L.A. Hart 
who rejected Mill’s vision of liberty, citing numerous factors that “diminish the 
significance to be attached to an apparently free choice or to consent.”127 Hart wrote: 
Choices may be made or consent given without adequate reflection or 
appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in 
various predicaments when the judgment is likely to be clouded; or under inner 
 
125 Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators:  An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 402 (2005). 
 
126 See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 
120 (1994) (arguing in favor of legitimizing voluntary euthanasia upon adoption of “clear criteria, rigorous 
procedures, and adequate safeguards” protecting individuals’ right to decide for themselves). 
 
127 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 21 (1963). 
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psychological compulsion; or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be 
susceptible of proof in a law court.128 
Few would disagree that people can make “bad” decisions (no matter how we 
define this term) and that their choices are seldom, if ever, free from various influences.  
Moreover, as Robin West has persuasively argued in her critique of Richard Posner’s 
rationalistic vision of the world, people are often driven by self-destructive forces, desires 
of failure or humiliation, and the ultimate yearning for authority.129 In many instances, 
people’s consent is socially predetermined, and choices people make may not be in their 
best interests.130 
These are all potent arguments in support of the claim that people’s freedom of 
choice is not absolute.  However, even limited as it is, that freedom has enormous 
personal and public value.  We associate civil rights with people’s ability to control their 
lives and make social and political choices.  The very concept of responsibility would 
lose sense if we take away people’s right to make their own mistakes and deal with the 
consequences.  Finally, the fact that people’s choices may be imperfect does not mean 
 
128 Id. at 21-22. 
 
129 See generally Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).  Criticizing the 
simplistic understanding of human nature by Posner and comparing his vision of the world with Kafka’s, 
West wrote: 
Kafka's characters usually do what they do -- go to work in the morning, become lovers, 
commit crimes, obey laws, or whatever -- not because they believe that by doing so they 
will improve their own well-being, but because they have been told to do so and crave 
being told to do so. Whereas Posner's characters relentlessly pursue autonomy and 
personal well-being, Kafka's characters just as relentlessly desire, need, and ultimately 
seek out authority.   
Id. at 387. 
 
130 See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives:  A Phenomenological Critique of 
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 96-97 (1987) (arguing that women consent and redefine 
relationships as consensual in order not to be violated); Mary Gibson, Rationality, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
193, 214-16 (1977) (discussing how people’s choices are determined by their socialization). 
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that the Big Brother is more likely to make better choices for them.  As Raul Roberts has 
correctly pointed out, 
Paternalism at its best entails well-meaning and justified interference with 
autonomous choice. But if in practice things do not work out for the best - if, for 
example, one's leaders are incompetent, corrupt, stupid, or evil - paternalism is the 
royal road to totalitarianism, since it invites government to substitute for its 
citizens' expressed preferences that which the state judges they “really” 
(objectively) want or need. This is a recipe for tyranny.131 
To summarize, laws that serve to ensure that people’s harmful self-regarding 
decisions are rational and voluntary, i.e. truly reflect their wishes, promote the values of 
liberty and autonomy.  Such laws should be balanced to require higher proof of 
rationality and voluntariness as the amount of harm increases.  At the same time, laws 
which deny people the power to make self-regarding decisions that hurt no one but 
themselves significantly encroach upon these people’s autonomy and, in the absence of 
other reasons, are unacceptable in a free democratic society. 
2.  Harm to Others:  Victim’s Consent May Be Overridden by Other 
Considerations. 
 
Most of non-paternalistic arguments used by courts to invalidate private 
arrangements involving bodily harm draw on Mill’s liberal theory and maintain that it is 
not the individual whom the state paternalistically seeks to protect from his own unwise 
decisions; it is rather society at large who will suffer if the individual is permitted to act 
as he wishes.132 As Joel Feinberg, whose famous four-volume treatise seeks to apply 
Mill’s principles to modern law, phrased it, 
 
131 Roberts, supra note 8, at 228. 
 
132 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. IV, ¶¶ 10-11 (New York 1869) (stating that “the only purpose for 
which power can rightfully be exercised over a member of a civilized community against his will is to 
prevent harm to others”). 
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It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the 
actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other means that is 
equally effective at no greater cost to other values.133 
The long list of harms an individual can inflict upon society by consenting to 
physical injury or death includes military, economic, socio-political and moral harms. 
 a.  Military Service.   
Following the common law tradition,134 some courts continue to invalidate 
consent to personal harm, opining that a person may not consent to an act that would 
deprive society of his military service. 135 In State v. Bass, the court remarked that the 
“commonwealth needs the services of its citizens quite as much as the kings of England 
needed the services of theirs.”136 Considering the realities of the modern day military 
operations, this argument is very much out of date.137 
In addition, military courts have found service-related arguments for invalidating 
consent to sadomasochistic activities, even when the harmed person was a civilian 
spouse.  One cited reason was the correlation between “family violence or dysfunction 
and soldiers’ ability to properly perform their military duties.”138 Another reason was the 
military’s interest in the servicemen’s reputation:  some of the wife’s bruises were visible 
and could “lead friends and neighbors to form a negative opinion of her soldier-
 
133 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter 
OFFENSE TO OTHERS] (defining the harm principle). 
 
134 See discussion supra, note 41 and the accompanying text. 
 
135 Note, Consent in the Criminal Law:  Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L.REV. 148, 165 (1976).  
136 State v. Bass, 120 S.E. 2d 580, 586 (N.C. 1961). 
 
137 See, e.g., Regina v. Brown, [1994] 1 AC 212 (Lord Mustill’s opinion) (arguing that the military service 
rationale for punishing consensual bodily harm “is now quite out of date”).   
 
138 Arab, 55 M.J. at 517. 
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husband.”139 The Army certainly has an interest in the well-being and good service of its 
members.  Yet, criminal sanctions are hardly appropriate when one’s crime amounts 
merely to jeopardizing the quality of one’s work and one’s reputation among neighbors.   
 b. Public Charge.   
A more general argument in favor of the state’s right to strike individuals’ self-
regarding decisions is based upon the risk that these individuals would become a “public 
charge.”140 Courts have held that the state has an “interest in preventing citizens who are 
capable of being productive members of society from disabling themselves if they or 
their dependents would be forced to rely either on the gifts of others or on the state itself 
for support.”141 
Joel Feinberg has suggested an autonomy-respecting argument that would still 
allow the state to intervene in its citizens’ private decisions.   He points out that we 
cannot let people gamble recklessly with their lives and then turn our backs on them 
because that would render the whole national character cold and hard.  To avoid that 
harm, society is forced to intervene. 142 
Realistically, we just can’t let people wither and die in front of our eyes; 
and if we intervene to help, as we inevitably must, it will cost us a lot of 
money.  There are certain risks then of an apparently self-regarding kind 
that persons cannot be permitted to run, if only for the sake of others who 
must either pay the bill or turn their backs on intolerable misery.143 
139 Id.  
 
140 See e.g., State v. Bass, 120 S.E. 2d 580, 586 (N.C. 1961). (“Our government is deeply concerned, 
financially and otherwise, for the health of its citizens and that they not become a public charge.”).   
 
141 Id. 
 
142 HARM TO SELF, supra note 20, at 80-81. 
 
143 Id. at 81. 
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The problem with this argument lies in its assumption that people may not behave 
in a way that imposes moral or economic costs on society, and that society is justified in 
restricting people’s rights solely on utilitarian grounds.  According to this logic, people 
who live below the poverty line may be criminally banned from having children.  And the 
mentally retarded may continue to be sterilized against their will.  This is exactly the kind 
of reasoning that Justice Holmes has used in his infamous Buck v. Bell opinion:  “It is 
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or 
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind.”144 
c. Breach of Peace. 
 
Another common argument, which has been successfully invoked for the past 
three hundred years, is that the state has the right to intervene in consensual activities if 
they constitute a breach of peace.145 Duels and prize fights have been held to threaten 
peace, therefore, an agreement to fight has been held invalid.146 Similarly, the defense of 
mutual combatants has been rejected because unregulated fights disturb public order.147 
144 Buck. v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 
145 See Matthew v. Ollerton (1692) Comb. 218, cited in Ingman, supra note 28, at 4 (holding that, if one 
licensed another to beat him, such license is no defense, because it is against the peace);  R.v. Donovan 
1934 2 K.B. 498 (opining that “combatants in prize fights commit assaults, as also do those who participate 
in breaches of the king’s peace or cause public disturbances”); Wright v. Starr, 179 P. 877, 878 (Nev. 1919) 
(holding that consent of the parties is invalid because fighting is a wrong committed against the public 
peace). 
 
146 See Bissell v. Starzinger, 83 N.W. 1065, 1066 (Iowa 1900) (holding that consent is not a defense for 
dueling based on public policy reason against breach of peace); Bundrick v. State, 54 S.E. 683, 685 (Ga. 
1906) (“If two men deliberately agree to fight a duel with deadly weapons, and the duel is fought pursuant 
to the agreement and one of them is killed, his slayer will be guilty of murder.”).   
 
147 See, e.g., U.S. v. Wilhelm, 36 M.J. 891, 893 (U.S. Air Force C.M.R. 1993) (holding that both parties to a 
mutual combat are wrongdoers, which precludes a claim that each participant in the affray has consented to 
the touching of his person). 
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The reasoning behind this policy has been that, when assaults are committed publicly or 
in the presence of others, they tend to incite riotous and disorderly or offensive 
behavior.148 
To the extent this argument is supported by data, it may have merit.  But then 
sports that generate violence should be outlawed as well, since spectator violence is a 
major sports-related problem.149 To be fair, the law has to be consistent.  Moreover, as 
English Court of Appeals has admitted, in the times of well established police force and 
numerous statutory offenses directed at specific instances of public disorder, the “breach 
of peace” rationale for disregarding consent to harm is outdated and unpersuasive.150 
d. Social Utility. 
To distinguish between sports and unregulated fights some courts have invoked 
the rationale of “social utility.”  That rationale validates or invalidates certain consensual 
behavior based on the resulting harms and benefits to the public.  For example, the 
common law recognizes lawful sports calculated to give bodily strength, skill and 
activity, and “to fit people for defense, public as well as personal, in time of need.”151 
Conversely, “it is not in the public interest that people should try to cause or should cause 
each other actual bodily harm for no good reason.”152 
148 See, e.g., State v. White 28 A. 968, 970 (R.I. 1894) (quoting Blackstone that, “besides actual breaches of 
peace, anything that tends to provoke or excite others to break it is an offense of the same denomination”).  
 
149 Abdal-Haqq, Ismat, Violence in Sports. ERIC DIGEST 1-89, available at http://www.ericdigests.org/pre-
9214/sports.htm (observing that group solidarity with players and coaches leads fans to view the opposing 
teams as enemies, and fosters hostility towards the “outgroup” and, by extension, to its supporters, 
geographical locale, ethnic group, and perceived social class). 
 
150 A-G Ref., [1981] Q.B. 715 (C.A.). 
 
151 Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 353 (Mass. 1876). 
 
152 A-G Ref., (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715. 
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Whether the utility of violent sports is high enough to justify their special 
treatment is an open question.153 Quoting a British judge, it is “very strange that a fight 
in private between two youths where one may, at most, get a bloody nose should be 
unlawful, whereas a boxing match where one heavyweight fighter seeks to knock out his 
opponent and possibly do him very serious damage should be lawful.”154 
Not surprisingly, sadomasochistic activities have not passed the utility test.155 In 
that context, a person may not give valid consent even to minor injuries, such as those 
caused by hot wax or needles.156 However, courts are much more tolerant if they can find 
a reason, other than sexual pleasure, behind the injurious acts.  In a British case, a man 
was convicted of assaulting his wife when, at her request, he branded his initials on her 
buttocks with a hot knife.  The appellate court reversed the conviction, saying that what 
the defendant did was rather akin to tattooing and, therefore, legitimate.157 
Aside from the obvious problems, such as inconsistency of treatment and poorly 
camouflaged moralism, the social utility rationale is hardly defensible even on the most 
basic level.  It presumes that the state has the right to criminalize any conduct merely for 
not being useful to society.  This presumption dangerously extends the “moral limits” of 
criminal law.  Consider, for instance, one of the biggest public health problems in the 
 
153 See, e.g., Regina v. Jobidon, [1991] S.C.R. 714, 762 (Can. 1991) (“Our social norms no longer correlate 
strength of character with prowess at fisticuffs.”). 
 
154 R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (Lord Slynn’s opinion). 
 
155 See, e.g., A-G Ref. (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] Q.B. 715, 719 (opining that “the satisfying of sado-
masochistic libido does not come within the category of good reason”). 
 
156 Washington v. Guinn , 2001 Wash. App WL 310398, at *15 (Wash.App. Div. March 30, 2004).  
 
157 R. v. Wilson, [1997] Q.B. 47 (explaining that the defendant assisted his wife in “what she regarded as 
the acquisition of a desirable piece of personal adornment, perhaps in this day and age no less 
understandable than the piercing of nostrils or even tongues for the purposes of inserting decorative 
jewelry”). 
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United States today – the overweight and obesity of a significant portion of the 
population.  Should that allow the state to criminalize possession and distribution of 
unhealthy food substances?      
 e.  Social Order and Respect to Law.   
 
This rationale is typically used to explain why one law is “good for all,” and why 
the state may not permit individuals to contract out of it.  In State v. Brown, an alcoholic-
wife and her husband had an agreement that, every time the wife became drunk, the 
husband would beat her up.158 As problematic as this arrangement is, it was invalidated 
not because of the apparent inadequacy of the wife’s consent (an alcoholic, quite likely 
suffering from the battered-spouse syndrome, and more than likely not agreeing to the 
beating at the very time of the beating).  Had the court convicted the husband because it 
found that the wife’s consent was either not given voluntarily or given voluntarily but 
later revoked, such decision would have been consistent with respect to personal 
autonomy, a key category for the concept of criminal responsibility.   
Instead, the court expressed complete indifference to the circumstances of the 
wife’s consent, saying that, in a criminal prosecution, “there is more at stake than a 
victim’s rights.”159 The court held that “[t]o allow an otherwise criminal act to go 
unpunished because of the victim’s consent would not only threaten the security of our 
society but also might tend to detract from the force of the moral principles underlying 
the criminal law.”160 
158 State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 28 (N.J. Super. 1976). 
 
159 Id. 
 
160 Id. 
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Preserving the rule of law certainly has public value.  Respect for law on each 
level of governance is the essence of a legal society.  That respect, however, would only 
suffer, if citizens perceive laws applied in particular cases as unfair or unnecessarily 
intrusive. The appellate court in Wilson (the case, in which a man was convicted for 
branding his initials on his wife’s buttocks), reversed the conviction, prudently observing 
that “[c]onsensual activity between husband and wife, in the privacy of the matrimonial 
home, is not in our judgment, normally a proper matter for criminal investigation, let 
alone criminal prosecution.”161 
Suppose we change the facts of Brown to eradicate doubts about the validity of 
the wife’s consent.  Suppose she is not an alcoholic.  Instead, she is a deeply religious 
woman, like the one sympathetically described by the U.K. Law Commission in a 
consultation paper about consent in criminal law:   
She is on the liberal edge of the Roman Catholic church and was catechized in the 
pre-Vatican II church.  She takes her religion seriously . . ..  For many years she 
has occasionally found self-mortification the appropriate penance, if she has 
behaved in a way that falls gravely short of what a committed Christian faith 
involves. . . . Now that she is married, her husband helps her.  He inflicts an 
adequate level of pain to ensure that the punishment is full and effective.  As she 
put it, the threshold for “actual bodily harm” is clearly exceeded.162 
People may approve or disapprove of the way this couple practices religion.  
However, under the current law – in theory and in practice – the “religious” husband is 
not guilty of any offence.  Comparing the two situations, I suggest that the rationale of 
Brown is misleading and the real question the court should have dealt with was the highly 
 
161 R. v. Wilson, [1997] Q.B. 47. 
 
162 LCC 1995 Paper, supra note 7, at 131. 
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suspicious character of the wife’s consent to beating rather than an individual’s ability to 
consent to beating as such.   
By invalidating private consensual arrangements that have no significant public 
impact, society disempowers and alienates its citizens, and often jeopardizes the very 
values it seeks to protect.  It is well documented that the public’s view of consensual 
harm differs dramatically from the one promoted by law.  A famous study of the 
American jury has shown that, from the jury perspective, “insofar as the victim is 
disqualified from complaining, there is no cause for intervention by the state and its 
criminal law.”163 As a result, jurors tend to use the power of nullification and disregard 
both the formal instructions and their own oath to follow these instructions when they 
perceive that the law goes against the community’s principles of appropriate liability and 
punishment.164
f.  Immorality.   
The immorality argument165 is similar to the “social order and respect to law” 
argument.   It has been used by American courts primarily to ban perceived sexual 
transgressions.  Historically, examples of moral legislation criminalizing consensual 
conduct have included laws against sodomy, fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, 
and prostitution.  In addition, courts have routinely disqualified sadomasochistic activities 
from any defense or statutory exclusion.  In Collier, for example, the court opined:  “[I]t 
is obvious to this court that the legislature did not intend [to legitimize] an activity which 
 
163 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 193-347 (1966).   
 
164 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997). 
 
165 Here I address only the immorality argument within the paradigm of “harm to others.”  It should be 
distinguished from the argument promoted by legal moralists, according to whom an act may be 
criminalized simply because it is immoral.  See infra notes 247-53 and the accompanying text. 
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has been repeatedly disapproved by other jurisdictions and considered to be in conflict 
with the general moral principles of our society.”166 
Up until recently, there has been little doubt that protecting morality, even within 
private relationships of grown-up citizens, is a legitimate state interest.167 Lately, 
however, the immorality rationale has started to lose legal ground.  In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court has invalidated anti-sodomy laws and overturned its conflicting 
earlier decision, holding:  “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today.”168 The court admitted that, for centuries homosexual conduct was 
condemned as immoral, and, for many people, it is still completely unacceptable.169 Yet, 
these considerations were held not to be sufficient for criminal prosecution.170 
It is noteworthy that, at the time when Bowers was decided, twenty-four States 
and the District of Columbia criminalized consensual sodomy.171 Logically, if Bowers 
was a wrong decision, despite the legislative condemnation of sodomy by half of the 
nation, then the Collier court’s deference to the moral disapproval of sadomasochism in 
other jurisdictions may be equally unwarranted.172 
166 Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 307. 
167 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). See also Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (citing Bowers in upholding Alabama's prohibition on the sale of sex toys on the ground that 
safeguarding public morality is a legitimate government interest). 
 
168 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).   
 
169 Id. at 571. 
 
170 Id. (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).  See also R v. Brown, [1994] 
1 A.C. 212 (“There is a realm of sexual behaviour which, although the majority of people would condemn 
on moral grounds, should not be the subject of the criminal law.”). 
 
171 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93 (1986). 
 
172 This is particularly so if we consider the latest report by Kinsey’s Institute, according to which five to 
ten percent of the U.S. population engages in sadomasochistic sex on at least an occasional basis.  JUNE M. 
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Criticizing the Court’s changed views, Justice Scalia wrote in his dissenting 
opinion: 
 
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain 
forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and unacceptable,” -- the same interest 
furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, 
bestiality, and obscenity.  Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest. The 
Court today reaches the opposite conclusion. . . .  This effectively decrees the end 
of all morals legislation.173 
Indeed, the Lawrence opinion seems to prohibit any legislation adopted on purely 
moral grounds.  Moreover, some of the laws listed by Justice Scalia (e.g., against 
fornication, adultery, and to some extent adult incest)174 have been repealed prior to 
Lawrence. That makes “immorality” alone a weak rationale in a prosecution for 
consensual bodily harm. 
* * *
To sum up various “public harm” rationales, it appears rather uncontroversial that 
the state has a legitimate right to criminalize public behavior to the extent it harms or 
offends others. Therefore, laws directed at conduct that constitutes a public nuisance or is 
likely to stir up violence are completely justifiable.175 As for private conduct between 
consenting adults, the standard rationales cited by courts do not sound compelling.   
In addition to specific flaws discussed above, these rationales do not explain one 
major contradiction.  If we truly criminalize certain behavior in order to avoid negative 
 
REINISCH, PH.D. & RUTH BEASLEY, M.L.S., KINSEY INSTITUTE NEW REPORT ON SEX: WHAT YOU MUST 
KNOW TO BE SEXUALLY LITERATE (Debra Kent ed., 1990). 
 
173 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (citations omitted). 
 
174 See N.J.S.A § 2A:114-2 (1978)(criminalizing incest, but repealed by L.1978, C.95 § 2C. 98-2 eff. Sept. 
1979); 13 V.S.A § 201,202 (1980)(criminalizing adultery and bigamy, but repealed by No. 223 (Adj Sess.), 
§ 214. 1981); R. I. Gen. Laws. §§ 11-6-3 and 11-6-4 (1988)(criminalizing fornication and incest but 
repealed by P.L 1989, ch. 214 §1 1989). 
 
175 See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11 (1984). [hereinafter 
HARM TO OTHERS]; Duff, supra note 20, at 39-44. 
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consequences to society, how come an individual is free to cause himself all the same 
harms and not be liable for that?  Neither attempted suicide nor any form of self-inflicted 
torture or mayhem is criminally punishable today.176
One might argue that, by criminalizing assistance to harm, we significantly reduce 
the number of instances when that harm is actually done.177 That may be true.  Yet, we 
should acknowledge that, by reducing the sheer number of harmful incidents, we impose 
significant pain and indignity on the ultimate victims, i.e. those whose exercise of 
autonomy is thus infringed.178 Consider some examples of what the BIID sufferers 
encounter in order to achieve their goal – the amputation of unwanted limbs. 
In May of 1998 a seventy-nine-year-old man from New York traveled to Mexico 
and paid $10,000 for a black-market leg amputation; he died of gangrene in a 
motel.  On October 1999 a mentally competent man in Milwaukee severed his 
arm with a homemade guillotine, and threatened to sever it again if surgeons 
reattached it.  That same month a legal investigator for the California state bar, 
after being refused a hospital amputation, tied off her legs with tourniquets and 
began to pack them on ice, hoping that gangrene would set in, necessitating an 
amputation.  She passed out and ultimately gave up.  Now she says she will 
probably have to lie under a train, or shoot her legs off with a shotgun.179 
Choices regarding death are even more dramatic.  Based on the recent Supreme 
Court’s decisions, one has no constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide.180 
176 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 15.6, 543 n.3 (2d ed. 2003) (“No state has a 
statute making successful suicide a crime.”).   
 
177 See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730-734 (1997). 
 
178 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 413 (1988) (“Depriving a person of opportunities or 
of the ability to use them is a way of causing him harm.”); Duff, supra note 20, at 30 (opining that limiting 
one’s ability to make self-regarding choices is “in some sense, an evil that seriously impairs the life, the 
flourishing, the well-being . . . of the person whose exercise of autonomy is thus infringed”). 
 
179 Elliot, supra note 99. 
 
180 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor concurring) (opining that “our Nation’s history, legal 
traditions, and practices” do not support one’s right to commit a suicide).  
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However, one has the right to starve oneself to death.181 It is quite possible that fewer 
people choose this torturous way of dying compared to the death by a lethal injection.  
But is this a sufficient reason to continue criminalizing assisted suicide?   
To answer this question, suppose that a legislature considers a bill, which 
advocates a new level of capital punishment for particularly egregious crimes:  death by 
starvation.  Assume further that the bill is accompanied by a convincing study, which 
shows that, by this simple change in the form of the death penalty, we can reduce the 
violent crime rate by 50 percent.  Deterrence is one of the main priorities of criminal 
justice.  Yet it is highly unlikely that the reduction of crime (and even the accompanying 
reduction in the number of death penalties) would make us adopt such a law.  If we are 
not willing to make criminals suffer a painful and degrading death despite any potential 
reduction in the number of crimes and executions, how then can we use the same 
numerical argument to prohibit humane forms of dying to non-criminals?    
 E.  Where to Go from Here? 
In Part I, I have reviewed the current state of the law of consent.  My goal was to 
identify a principle or set of principles, pursuant to which certain forms of consensual 
harmful behavior are permitted while other forms are criminally banned.  The existing 
legislation did not prove to be particularly helpful in that regard.  As it is often the case 
with basic categories, the line between permissible and impermissible may be better 
explained in historic rather than logical terms.   
I then explored how courts apply statutory provisions to various instances of 
consensual harm.  The results of that quest were not quite satisfactory either.  Over the 
 
181 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (confirming one’s 
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition).   
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years, courts have treated similar cases very differently, allowing or disallowing 
particular harm depending on judges’ personal moral beliefs; often without much 
consistency or explanation.  
I finally looked at the rationales cited by judges in support of their decisions.  Not 
surprisingly, in different times and circumstances, courts have used different rationales 
for the rule.  One thing, however, remained constant – most rationales are based on the 
autocratic concept of the law.  In the world of these rationales, an individual is incapable 
of looking after himself and has no personal interests deserving legal protection separate 
from, or opposite to, the interests of society.   
In addition to being autocratic, the rule of consensual harm is absolute.  People 
are allowed to consent to harm only if their activities are on the list of things approved by 
the state.  A mere inconvenience to the state overrides individuals’ interests in autonomy 
and personal fulfillment.  No balancing or accommodation of conflicting interests is 
envisioned.  The disregard for an individual, inherent in that rule, goes against the basic 
principles of fairness and responsibility defining American criminal law.  Moreover, the 
authoritarian presumption that it is not individuals but rather the state that is the victim of 
every crime is plainly wrong because, if this were so, then consent would not be a 
defense to any, not merely physical, harm.182 
This critique prompts a difficult question:  if the statutory line between the lawful 
and unlawful activities is arbitrary; the application of the law is inconsistent; and the 
articulated rationales for the law are unpersuasive, shall we get rid of any limitations on 
one’s power to consent to personal harm?  Were we to choose this route, we could 
 
182 See Dubber, supra note 19, at 569 (pointing out that, “if the state were indeed the victim of every crime, 
then consent should be a defense to none.”). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
46
certainly accommodate some of the valid legislative and judicial concerns.  For instance, 
to avoid breach of peace and “offense to others,”183 we could limit permissible harm to 
private activities outside of the public view.184 And to address legitimate worries about 
the voluntariness and rationality of consent to harm, we could provide for strict 
procedural requirements that would guard putative victims from abuse.  We should 
understand, however, that these substantive and procedural concessions would not 
necessarily outlaw such phenomena as consensual deadly torture, live cannibalism or 
gladiatorial contests.   
But if we reject that solution, there is only one other option left:  to identify what 
really bothers us in the permissibility of one’s unrestrained power to consent to physical 
harm.  To do that, we need to offer an alternative rationale for the limitation on the power 
to consent, and try to draw the line between lawful and unlawful activities based on that 
rationale.  For these purposes, in the next Part, I will: (a) analyze the role of consent in 
application to bodily harm, as opposed to other offenses; (b) identify the harm that may 
and should be criminalized despite the victim’s valid consent; (c) discuss how the 
victim’s consent affects the wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s act; and (d) outline a set of 
conditions necessary for the perpetrator’s acquittal.   
 
183 See OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 132, at xiii (“It is always a good reason in support of a proposed 
criminal prohibition that it is probably necessary to prevent serious offense to persons other than the actor 
and would probably be an effective means to that end if enacted.”).  
184 This is the approach taken by the United Kingdom with respect to prostitution.  See THE WOLFENDEN 
REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, (Stein & Day 1963). 
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II.    UNDERSTANDING AND REVISING THE DEFENSE OF CONSENT 
 A.  Two Roles of Consent. 
1.  Offense or Defense:  Why Does It Matter? 
An unavoidable question for anyone contemplating the boundaries of consent in 
criminal law is:  why the victim’s consent to sex renders the defendant not guilty of rape, 
whereas the victim’s consent to injury has no similar effect?  Clearly, this is not because 
we regard rape as a less serious offense than injury.  If necessary for their defense, 
victims of sexual assault are allowed to kill, not merely injure, their attackers. 
That question, in fact, reveals an important conceptual confusion, specifically, the 
legislative and judicial failure to distinguish the two roles that consent may play in 
connection with an offense.185 First, the lack of consent may be a part of the definition of 
an offense, i.e. a part of “the minimal set of elements necessary to incriminate the 
actor.”186 For example, a person may not be guilty of rape if his sexual partner has given 
him valid consent.187 Non-consent plays an inculpatory role in the offense of rape.   
The other role consent may play is exculpatory. That happens when consent is 
used as a defense of justification to negate a prima facie criminal violation.   Consent to 
physical harm in a lawful athletic contest, as we remember, is a defense under the 
 
185 These two roles are widely recognized, for example, in German criminal law scholarship.   See Gregor 
Bachmann, Volenti non fit iniuria - How to make a principle work, 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL No. 10 (1 
October 2003), (pointing out that most scholars accept the distinction between an element of an offense and 
a defense as helpful systematization). 
 
186 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 705. 
 
187 Naturally, consent may be legally invalid (e.g., due to minority of age or mental incapacity).  In that 
case, the factual consent may be disregarded.   See, e.g., MPC § 213.1(1)(d) (the perpetrator is guilty of 
rape if the female is less than 10 years old); MPC § 213.1(2)(b) (holding the perpetrator guilty of rape if he 
knows that the female “suffers from a mental disease of defect which her incapable of appraising the nature 
of her conduct”). 
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MPC.188 How shall we determine in which case consent plays which role and why does 
that matter? 
Let’s start with the second part of the question.  The role of consent matters, 
among other things, because it defines the boundaries of specific conduct rules 
communicated to the community.  George Fletcher has perceptively observed that 
inculpatory and exculpatory functions of an element reflect the difference between a duty 
to obey a prohibitory legal norm and a privilege to violate it when justificatory 
circumstances are present.189 Take the offense of reckless driving:   
Logically, one could claim that the norm was directed against all driving.  In 
exceptional cases, safe (or non-reckless) driving would justify a violation of the 
norm.  In this mode of thinking, a case of safe driving would be treated as a 
justified violation of the norm; if recklessness were an element of the definition, 
non-reckless or safe driving would not violate the norm.190 
Fletcher is certainly right that, in our society, it would be unthinkable to prohibit 
driving altogether.  The only morally coherent norm would be one that prohibits reckless 
driving.  It follows that “recklessly” is an element of the definition and not a defense.191 
The above example is rather uncontroversial.  Consent raises more serious problems.  
Fletcher, for instance, leaves the question open in its application to larceny.192 “We find 
it hard to determine whether taking and using another’s property is sufficiently 
incriminating to constitute an incriminating event.”193 
188 MPC § 2.11(2)(b).  See also Hurd, supra note 17, at 133 (pointing out the difference between consent 
that can transform a wrong act into a right act, and consent that merely grants another a right to do wrong). 
 
189 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 562. 
 
190 Id. at 567. 
 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 568 (“The issue of consent in larceny is particularly difficult to classify.”). 
 
193 Id. 
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I disagree with this expansive vision of criminal law.  The law that creates a 
presumption of guilt whenever there is a mere suspicion of foul play paves the road to a 
police state.  Such law would discourage socially useful behavior and unjustifiably 
intervene with people’s autonomy.  For instance, all trade that involves exchange of 
goods (i.e. taking and using another’s property) would be under the criminal suspicion.194 
In addition, such a law may have a disparate effect on different social groups.  The poor 
and socially disenfranchised would be disproportionally under suspicion whenever they 
are seen “taking and using another’s property.” For all these reasons, consent should play 
an inculpatory role in the offense of larceny. 
How we classify an element not only affects a social norm of conduct but also has 
two important consequences in a criminal trial: one deals with the burden of proof, the 
other with the mens rea required for the defendant’s acquittal.          
The allocation of burdens of production and persuasion between the government 
and the defendant often depends on whether the element in question is a part of an 
offense or an affirmative defense.  In the first case, both burdens are on the prosecutor.  
He must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.195 In the second 
case, the burden of production is usually on the defendant.  If he produces evidence with 
respect to self-defense but not with respect to insanity, the judge will have to instruct the 
jury on the law of self-defense but not insanity, and the defendant will not be entitled to 
have the issue of insanity considered by the jury in its deliberations.196 Who has the 
 
194 Fletcher himself made a similar point in his earlier work.  See George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for 
the Wrong Reason, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293, 319 (1975). 
 
195 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 64 (3rd ed.). 
 
196 Id. at 65. 
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burden of persuasion with respect to an affirmative defense depends on the jurisdiction:  
in some states it is the government; in other states the defendant.197 Clearly, it is in the 
defendant’s interests that an element be characterized as included in the definition of an 
offense rather than a defense, since in that case the full burden of proof will be on the 
prosecution. 
The second important consequence of treating consent as an exculpatory rather 
than inculpatory element involves the defendant’s mens rea. The specific question is:  
must the defendant be aware of the victim’s consent in order to be acquitted?  If consent 
is an element of the charged offense, the answer is no, since the very presence of consent 
negates an element required for conviction.  For example, consensual sex is not rape, 
even if one of the partners is not aware of the other’s consent.198 
However, when consent is a defense, the knowledge of the justifying 
circumstance is essential.199 This difference stems from the very nature of justification as 
 
197 Id. at 73.   
 
198 It may be an attempted rape though under MPC § 5.01(1)(a) and its state analogues. See MPC § 
5.01(1)(a) (“A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for commission of the crime, he . . . purposely engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be.”).  In the majority of 
states, an attempt is treated as a less serious crime than the target offense. SEE KADISH & SHULHOFFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 554 (7th ed.). 
 
199 See MPC § 3.02 cmt. 2 at 11 (stating that, to qualify for the defense of necessity, “the actor must 
actually believe that his conduct is necessary to avoid an evil”).  R. v. Dadson (1850) 4 Cox. C.C. 358 
(stating that “whenever justification or excuse appear in a criminal case, not only must the circumstances of 
justification or excuse appear but the defendant must have known of, or believed in, those circumstances”).  
See also Fletcher, supra note 192, at 318-21 (arguing that, when the absence of consent is an element of an 
offense, even un-communicated consent releases the actor from liability; however, when consent serves as 
a defense, the actor must be aware of it);  Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1595-1600 (2002) (arguing in favor of subjective theory of justification, 
according to which the actor is justified when he is aware of justifying circumstances and takes them into 
account when choosing his course of action).  But see Paul Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal 
Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 288-91 (1975) (arguing that claims 
of justification should prevail regardless of the actor’s state of mind); Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils:  A 
closer look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 Law & Phil’y  611, 626-36 (arguing that self-defense but 
not other defenses requires defendant’s knowledge of justifying circumstances). 
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a limited privilege given to those who have committed a prima facie violation but whose 
actions “the law does not condemn, [and] even welcomes.”200
For example, we want people to defend themselves against unlawful aggression; 
therefore, we justify harm and even killing committed in the proper exercise of self-
defense.  This justification is tailored for a specific purpose – protection of an innocent 
party.  Its teleological nature mandates that the defendant do no more harm than is 
necessary for his protection.201 That conduct rule would lose any sense, however, if we 
disregard the defendant’s subjective knowledge of the justifying circumstances.  How 
shall people determine what actions are permissible if they are not aware of the threat 
against which they are supposed to measure these actions? 
This discussion shows that treating consent as an element of a definition or a 
defense may have important consequences for societal norms of conduct.  In addition, the 
role assigned to consent may affect the outcome of a criminal trial.  On balance, the 
defendant is in a much better position if consent plays an inculpatory role:  the prosecutor 
has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to the defendant’s 
actions and, if he fails that burden, the defendant may not be found guilty of the 
completed offense, even if he mistakenly thought that he was acting against the victim’s 
will.  If, however, consent of the victim is an element of the defense, the defendant may 
be required to establish not only the fact of the victim’s consent but also his subjective 
awareness of that fact.   
 
200.HART, supra note 126, at 13 (1968). 
 
201 See, e.g., MPC § 3.04(2) (listing limitations on the use of force). 
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Now, how shall courts determine the role of consent in a particular case?  An easy 
way would be to use the formal criteria and rely on the wording of the relevant statute.  
This approach, however, is problematic for at least two reasons.  One is conceptual 
incoherence of legislative labeling of consent, and the other is the questionable 
constitutionality of such random labeling and re-labeling.  
 2. The Problem of Conceptual Incoherence. 
For an illustration of the first problem, take the offense of criminal mischief 
(destruction of property of another) punishable in all states and under the MPC.  Pursuant 
to thirty-one state codes, non-consent is, explicitly or implicitly, an element of the 
offense.202 In the remaining jurisdictions, consent is either included in the penal code as 
an affirmative defense203 or is not specifically part of the code.204 In the case of any 
ambiguity, courts have to interpret the functional meaning of consent, and these 
interpretations differ quite dramatically.   
 
202 ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.475;  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-1604; 
ARK. CODE ANN §§ 5-38-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 594; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a. 
15; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13; GA. CODE ANN § 16-7-21; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 708-820; 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7001;  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2; 
IOWA CODE §§ 716.3; KAN. CRIM. CODE. ANN § 21-3720; KY REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 512.020;  LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:56;  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 14:56; MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 266 
§104;  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595;  MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-6-101; N.H. REV. STAT. § 634.2; 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.12; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2909.07;  OR. 
REV. STAT. § 164.365;  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-34-1; TENN. CODE.  ANN. § 39-14-408; TEX. 
PENAL. CODE. ANN. § 28.03;  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3701; WIS STAT. § 943.01;  WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-3-201.  
 
203 See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-501; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 811; N.J. STAT. ANN § 
2C:17-3; 18 PA. CONS. STAST. ANN. § 3304.    
 
204 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-303;  MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-301; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 750.377a; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-519; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 206.310; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-127; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1760; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
11-44-1; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-510; UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-6-106; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
137. 
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For example, neither in Pennsylvania, nor in New Jersey is non-consent explicitly 
listed as an element of criminal mischief.  Each statute describes the offense through 
damage to the “property of another” but neither defines the term “property of another” 
either in the relevant section or generally.  A comment to the New Jersey Penal Code, 
however, explains that “‘property of another’ has been defined in other sections of the 
Code to include any property in which a person other than the defendant has an interest 
and which the defendant is not privileged to infringe.”205 This explanation, similar to the 
one offered in an MPC commentary,206 effectively incorporates the requirement of non-
consent into the definition of criminal mischief. 
A Pennsylvania court, however, has reached an opposite conclusion when it held 
that the criminal mischief statute does not require the prosecution to prove the lack of 
consent by the owner of the property.207 “All that is required under [the statute] 
regarding the owner is that the property belong to another person.”208 
Moreover, even when the language of the statute implies that the owner’s non-
consent is an element of the offense but does not say so specifically, courts may interpret 
the statute as not requiring proof of the owner’s non-consent for the defendant’s 
conviction.  Under New York law, for instance, a person is guilty of criminal mischief 
when he intentionally damages property of another person, “having no right to do so nor 
 
205 33 GERALD D MILLER, N.J. PRAC. CRIMINAL LAW § 13.6 (3rd ed.) (commenting on N.J. STAT. § 2C:17-
3). 
 
206 The MPC does not list non-consent as an element of criminal mischief and does not define “property of 
another” with respect to criminal mischief.  However, a commentary to the criminal mischief section says 
that “there would seem no reason not to apply the term ‘property of another’ as defined in ‘[the Theft and 
Related Offenses’].” MPC § 220.3, cmt. 3 at 45.   
 
207 Commonwealth v. Zambelli, 695 A. 2d 848, 850 (Pa. Super. 1997). 
 
208 Id. 
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any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right.”209 Despite this rather suggestive 
language, a court held that the proof of the owner’s lack of consent was not necessary to 
convict the defendant, among other things, of criminal mischief for breaking into a tavern 
and stealing some money.210 
These discrepancies make it hard to rely on the statutory language for purposes of 
determining the role of consent in a particular case.  For the sake of a coherent message 
to the community and fair treatment of defendants charged with similar violations, it is 
essential to determine the proper meanings of consent in relation to various offenses and, 
if necessary, revise the penal codes accordingly. 
 3. The Problem of Questionable Constitutionality 
The constitutionality problem may be even more serious:  it is unclear to what 
extent states are free to define traditional offenses so that an important element be 
transformed into a defense.  Pursuant to the Winship doctrine developed by the United 
States Supreme Court in the 1970s, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments requires that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged.211 This rule was further developed in Mullaney 
v. Wilbur212 and Patterson v. New York.213 
Those two cases were similar in that, in each of them, the state had attempted to 
present the “heat of passion” or “extreme emotional disturbance” as a defense that had to 
 
209 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145 (McKinney 1988). 
 
210 People v. Battle, 202 A.D.2d 1045, 1045 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 
211 397 U.S. 358, 361-363 (1970). 
 
212 421 U.S. 684, 699-702 (1975). 
 
213 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). 
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be proven by the defendant in order to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter.  In 
Mullaney, the Supreme Court unanimously held the state’s theory unconstitutional 
because it was the prosecutor’s, not the defendant’s, task to prove that the killing was 
premeditated and not provoked.214 According to a commentator, Mullaney “clearly 
carried within it the potential to invalidate all ‘affirmative defenses’ that shifted the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant on any matter relating to guilt, innocence, or 
degrees of culpability.”215 
However, in Patterson decided only two years later, the narrowly divided 
Supreme Court has significantly weakened the import of Mullaney by declining “to adopt 
as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the 
culpability of an accused.”216 The Court has recognized that its holding “may seem to 
permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses 
at least some of the elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes.”217 At the same 
time, the Patterson majority has warned that “there are obviously constitutional limits 
beyond which the States may not go in this regard.”218 
Unfortunately, neither in Patterson, nor in later cases did the Court identify those 
“constitutional limits,” except for the basic requirement that the legislature may not 
 
214 421 U.S. at 698. 
 
215 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future? 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 269 
(2001). 
 
216 432 U.S. at 210. 
 
217 Id.  
 
218 Id. 
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“declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.”  As one scholar has 
pointed out, the “Winship/Mullaney/Patterson line of ‘affirmative defense’ decisions 
essentially died out, with barely a whimper.”219 
It cannot, therefore, be determined with certainty how the Supreme Court would 
regard an attempt to move consent across the boundary line between offenses and 
defenses.  On the one hand, the existing inconsistency in the treatment of consent (e.g., in 
the case of criminal mischief) suggests that making consent an affirmative defense, at 
least in some instances, may be permissible.  On the other hand, it would be unthinkable 
to make consent a mere defense in the case of many other offenses (e.g., theft, 
kidnapping, criminal trespass).   Removing the reference to consent from the definition of 
theft, for instance, would eliminate the only wrongful element (the absence of the 
owner’s consent) in that definition and would, in fact, render the defendant 
“presumptively guilty.”   
Due to these conceptual and constitutional uncertainties, one may not rely on the 
historically settled statutory language.  Instead, it is important to identify a coherent 
principle that would allow one to distinguish permissible conduct from impermissible. 
 4. Determining the Role of Consent. 
 
Determining the role of an element in a particular case is not always easy.  George 
Fletcher correctly maintains that, to distinguish a definition from a defense, we need to 
identify a prohibitory norm, which “must contain a sufficient number of elements to state 
a coherent moral imperative.”220 What Fletcher does not tell us is how to apply this norm 
 
219 Hoffmann, supra note 213, at 272. 
 
220 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 658. 
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to the suspect element in order to determine its function, and without that, this 
methodology is of limited practical use.221 
I suggest that, to understand the role of consent with respect to a particular 
offense, we should identify the prohibitory norm underlying that offense and then apply it 
to the perpetrator’s voluntary act (its nature and result, using the MPC categories).222 In 
other words, we should evaluate the moral quality of the act independently of the 
justifying circumstance of consent.223 If there is no prima facie moral prohibition against 
that act, consent should play the inculpatory role and be an element of the definition.  
Only when the act itself violates a prohibitory norm, should consent be a defense.  
Consider offenses of rape, kidnapping, theft, and trespass,224 to name just a few.  
In all of them, the act itself does not violate a prohibitory norm.  Having sex, transporting 
someone to a different location, taking other people’s property or entering someone’s 
home is not bad per se. It becomes bad only due to the attendant circumstance, namely, 
the lack of consent; i.e., unless consent is missing, the conduct is outside the boundaries 
of criminal law.  Therefore, in each of these offenses, non-consent should be included in 
the language of the definition.   
 
221 Fletcher himself admits that his methodology may be insufficiently precise to resolve cases in the 
borderline between definition and justification.  See id. 
222 See MPC § 1.13(9) & 1.13(10).  See also MPC § 2.02 cmt. 1 (observing that “material elements” of an 
offense include conduct, attendant circumstances and the result included in the description of the offense).    
 
223 I use the term “voluntary act,” and not “actus reus,” since the latter has been traditionally used to include 
the absence of justification and, sometimes, even excuse.  See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 
177-83 (1993) (including justification but not excuse); Meir Dan-Cohen, Actus Reus, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 15 (S. Kadish ed. 1983) (including both justification and excuse); GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 20 (2d ed.) (including both justification and excuse). 
 
224 For definitions of offenses, see, e.g., MPC §§ 213.1 (rape); 212.1 (kidnapping); 223.2 (theft); 221.2 
(trespass). 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
58
Conversely, killing or hurting another is bad per se. The fact that a person may be 
legally justified in, say, killing of another in self-defense does not make the killing as 
morally neutral as borrowing a book; it is still regrettable.225 It is still regrettable that a 
dental patient has to suffer pain, even though the dentist is justified in causing it.  To lose 
or reduce its inherent wrongfulness, the act of killing or hurting requires justification. To 
the extent consent can affect the moral character of that act, its role is exculpatory.  It 
should, therefore, be a defense, full or partial, and not a part of the definition.    
Thus, to decide how to treat consent in each particular case, we should ask:  what 
conduct rule do we want to convey to the community?  Do not have sex?  Do not take 
other people’s property?  Do not break other people’s property?  Certainly not.  Even the 
last rule, the most controversial of the three, would be unmerited and impracticable.  
There is nothing wrong with breaking things.  People may need to break things, including 
those belonging to others, in the process of construction, repair, cleaning, cooking, curing 
or just having fun.  We do not want to prohibit useful or morally neutral activities.  What 
we want to prohibit is engaging in these activities under the circumstances that make 
such activities wrongful.   
In contrast, causing pain, injury or death is not morally neutral.226 Bringing about 
a regrettable state of events is bad and should be avoided.227 Therefore, we would want a 
conduct rule that prohibits the very act of killing or hurting, providing of course for the 
 
225 Cf., Douglas N. Husak, Partial Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 167, 172 (1998) (“No one who believes 
that killings in self-defense are completely justified need suppose that the quantum of wrongfulness in all 
such killings is equivalent to that in, say, scratching one’s head.”).   
226 See, e.g., R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 AC 212 (Lord Lowry’s opinion) (opining that, “for one person to inflict 
any injury on another without good reason is an evil in itself (malum in se) and contrary to public policy”).  
 
227 See, e.g., 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 18 
(1988)[hereinafter HARMLESS WRONGDOING] (defining evil in the most generic sense as “occurrence or 
state of affairs that is rather seriously to be regretted”).  
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necessary exceptions (e.g., medical treatment, minimal harm or, in a non-consensual 
context, self-defense). 
In this regard, I disagree with those who view consent only as an event of non-
criminalization.228 Among them is, for instance, Paul Roberts who objects to the 
treatment of consent as a general defense.  In his view, it is neither “general” nor a 
“defense”.229 Instead, according to Roberts, “the significance of consent in the criminal 
law can only be ascertained through particularistic inquiries into specific types of 
injury,”230 e.g., such as may result from consensual fighting, dangerous sports, risky sex, 
medical treatment, cosmetic surgery, and euthanasia.231 
I strongly object to this approach.  If we follow the proposed route, we may end 
up with a list of rules that are entirely situation-specific and virtually useless because they 
are not based on a common legal principle and, therefore, give neither judges nor the 
general public an opportunity to resolve new conflicts.  Rejecting a categorical approach 
in favor of this essentially case-by-case method may present a serious legality problem 
and jeopardize the law’s fairness and moral authority.   
Moreover, in a coherent legal system that accounts for important moral 
distinctions, consent to bodily harm has to be conceptualized as an affirmative defense.  
Think of a mountaineer (A) who cuts off the leg of his injured friend (B) in order to save 
 
228 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 8, at 252-53 (opining that British consent project failed because consent 
was conceptualized as a general defense instead of a part of the definition of each relevant offense); 
Dubber, supra note 18, at 569 (suggesting that consent is “less a defense than a general limitation”); Paul 
H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 753-54 (1990) 
(criticizing the view that consent is a justification).  It is possible that Robinson’s claim was affected by the 
examples he reviewed.  All of them are indeed cases of non-criminalization and not justification. 
 
229 Roberts, supra note 8, at 252. 
 
230 Id. at 253. 
 
231 Id. 
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B’s life.  Assuming B has consented to the procedure, A would be justified.232 This is a 
justification and not a non-criminalization case because justified conduct always has a 
negative side effect, which we accept and forgive, yet we would much prefer if that 
accompanying evil could be avoided.  For instance, we justify people who kill in self-
defense or violate property rights of others in order to prevent a greater harm or evil.  
Similarly, we justify A, although we are sorry for B’s loss.  In contrast, we have no need 
to justify people who have consensual sex, visit each other or exchange property; their 
actions leave no undesirable residue that requires justification. 
What follows is that we need two sets of consent rules – one for cases in which 
consent plays the inculpatory role; and the other for cases in which its role is exculpatory.  
Instances of bodily harm all fit into the second category, which explains why analogies of 
consensual killing with consensual “theft” or “rape” do not work:  the latter examples 
belong to the first category of consent.  Consent alone is sufficient to make theft or rape 
impossible.  Significantly more is required to justify killing or maiming.          
Recognizing this difference can help, among other things, in drafting more 
consistent and fair legislation.  For example, in sexual offenses, offenses against property, 
burglary and trespass, the absence233 of consent should be expressly included in the 
relevant definition.  This revision is particularly needed and overdue in the area of sexual 
offenses. Most states still define rape through “forcible compulsion” and do not list the 
 
232 I also assume that A was right in his assessment of B’s condition.  If he was wrong but his mistake was 
reasonable, he should also be acquitted but pursuant to the defense of excuse.  See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra 
note 20, at 696-97, 762-69 (arguing that a mistake regarding the presence of justifying conditions negates 
justification).  See also Bergelson, supra note 124, at 404-06 (discussing why mistake should be a defense 
of excuse and not justification). 
 
233 By “absence” of consent, I mean its factual or legal deficiency.  E.g., consent given under duress or 
consent of a minor is legally invalid.  
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absence of consent as an element of the statute.234 This is unfair to both the victim and 
the defendant charged with rape.  As far as the victim is concerned, the gist of rape is 
nonconsensual intercourse; force is merely an important evidentiary and aggravating 
factor.235 The use of force or its absence can be taken into account at various stages of 
the trial without being a requisite element of the offense.  As David Bryden has 
persuasively argued, 
Let the jury take account of the absence of force in determining whether the 
encounter was consensual, and whether the defendant had the required mens rea; 
let the judge (or the statutory degree structure) take account of it in fixing the 
sentence. But if the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the penetration 
was nonconsensual, and that the defendant had the appropriate mens rea, why 
should the absence of force lead to an acquittal?236 
The revision of the statute would also be in the interests of the defendant.       
Many states view consent merely as an affirmative defense.237 If the statute is revised, it 
will no longer be the defendant’s job to raise the defense or (as is now the case in some 
jurisdictions)238 persuade the fact finder that consent has been granted. 
To conclude, it is important to distinguish between offenses, in which the act 
becomes wrongful due to the lack of consent, from offenses, in which the very conduct 
constitutes a prima facie norm violation.   All offenses involving injury or death belong 
 
234 See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2001) (defining rape as sexual intercourse with another person 
by forcible compulsion); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (2003) (same); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3121(2003) (same). 
235 See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 317, 355 (2000). 
 
236 Id. 
 
237 See, e.g., CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. § 53a-70; HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730; 
MICH.COMP.LAWS.ANN. § 750.520b; N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11; OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 
2907.05; WASH.REV.CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040. 
 
238 See WESTEN, supra note 20, at 129 n. 1 (observing that the State of Washington and the District of 
Columbia impose the burden of proof with respect to consent on defendants while at the same time 
imposing the burden of proof with respect to the use of force on the prosecution). 
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to the second group; therefore, with respect to those offenses, the victim’s consent may 
play only an exculpatory role.  Accordingly, those criminal statutes should be drafted 
without reference to consent. 
To understand in what circumstances consent may serve as a defense to bodily 
harm, it is first necessary to establish what constitutes criminal harm that a valid defense 
needs to override.  In the next section, I discuss what kinds of harm warrant criminal 
punishment.     
 B.  Kinds of Harm and Wrongdoing. 
Traditional Anglo-American legal theory distinguishes two kinds of harm to an 
individual.239 One is a setback to interests not accompanied by a violation of rights.240 
Usually, this kind of harm is insufficient for criminal liability.  A person may suffer an 
injury or loss due to a completely innocent act of another.  For example, a competitor’s 
success may financially harm a neighboring business owner, yet the competitor has done 
nothing wrong.  
 The second kind of harm is a “morally indefensible”241 right violation, which is 
often conceptualized as an unjustifiable setback to interests.242 Voluntary consent 
 
239 HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 174, at 31-36. 
 
240 For a detailed discussion of harms as setbacks to interests see, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 174 at 31-
64. The most essential, “welfare” interests are interests “in the necessary means to . . . more ultimate goals, 
whatever the latter may be or later come to be.”  Id. at 37.  Those include, among other interests, “the 
interests in the continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s own physical 
health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the absence of absorbing pain and 
suffering or grotesque disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability.” Id. 
241 Id. at 105-06. 
 
242 See, e.g., Hamish Stewart, Harms, Wrongs, and Set-Backs in Feinberg’s Moral Limits of the Criminal 
Law, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L.REV. 47, 65-66 (2001).  It is important to understand that one’s interest in personal 
liberty is violated even when the violation advances other victim’s interests.  For example, a person who 
was wrongfully prevented from taking a plane could turn out to be lucky if everyone on board was killed in 
a crash.  Yet the happy outcome does not relieve the wrongdoer from liability.  
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eliminates this kind of harm to the consenting individual.243 For example, I have a right 
not to be physically hurt by others.  By giving my consent to a dental treatment, I waive 
my claim of physical inviolability against my dentist and transfer to him the privilege and 
power of doing things that otherwise would constitute assault and battery.  But does 
consent always have the power to change the moral and legal character of another 
person’s actions?  What about the already mentioned acts that remain intuitively 
wrongful despite the valid consent of the victim, such as consensual gladiatorial contests, 
live cannibalism, deadly torture, and organ-harvesting killings?   
 Historically, these “free-floating evils”244 have been criminalized to avoid 
moral harm to the community.  As Michael Moore has put it, it is “plausible 
to think that the world is a morally better place when moral obligations are 
kept than when they are not, so it is plausible to motivate criminal legislation 
with this end.”245
There may be many reasons to reject moral legislation.  Thinking of Moore’s 
premise, I wonder whether a society in which all moral obligations are kept is even 
viable.  It appears that, if duty always wins over desire, curiosity, passion and 
desperation, such a society will inevitably stagnate and fall into demise.  But even if we 
assume that society is at its best when reliable, predictable and transparent, it still does 
not follow that criminal law is the appropriate mechanism for achieving that goal.  For 
 
243 HARM TO OTHERS supra note 174, at 115-17; JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 348-54, 
361 (1990) [hereinafter THOMSON] (explaining that consent is a mechanism by which a person may divest 
himself of a claim and transfer to another a privilege, a power, or an immunity). 
 
244 See HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 225 at 3-33. 
 
245 MOORE, supra note 20, at 649 (1997). 
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example, even the most selfish and cynical breach of a contract has remedies outside of 
criminal law.     
Criminalization of all moral transgressions (and that’s what the legal moralist 
legislator, according to Moore, should do)246 would require a lot of police enforcement, 
which is likely to result in a society marked with fear, persecution and alienation.  
Moreover, the majority of citizens in this Brave New World would likely be criminals.  
To give just one example, for a legal moralist legislator, “adultery should be made illegal 
because it is immoral.”247 Recent studies show that, were we to criminalize adultery 
today, we might end up with 50% of married adults being criminals.248 And there are 
many more ways to breach a moral obligation besides adultery.    
Granted, there are private immoralities that deserve condemnation, yet they are 
simply “not the law’s business.”249 Not punishing someone’s conduct does not mean 
approving of it; instead, that can mean the lack of standing to judge or condemn it.250 But 
if moral legislation is not a desirable option, do we necessarily have to permit any 
consensual harm?  
 
246 See id. at 645. 
 
247 Id. 
248 Nathan Tabor, Adultery Is Killing the American Family, NATIONAL LEDGER, Sept. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_2726846.shtml (reporting that, according to Peggy 
Vaughan, the author of “The Monogamy Myth,” about 60 percent of married men and 40 percent of 
married women will have an affair at some point during marriage).
249 Duff, supra note 20, at 36-37. 
 
250 Id. 
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Recently, a number of scholars have suggested that the concept of criminal harm 
should not be limited to a right violation.251 In their view, gladiatorial contests and 
similar acts are impermissible because they violate the participants’ dignity, and dignity 
is so essential to our humanity that, in cases of conflict between legally valid consent and 
dignity, the former ought to yield.252 Accordingly, consent may not serve as a defense to 
the violation of dignity.   
Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, argues that the reason society should outlaw 
slavery, even in the hypothetical case of voluntary “happy slaves,”253 is because slavery 
represents a paradigm of injustice, which by its very terms denies people equal moral 
worth and thus treats them with disrespect. 254 Similarly, Antony Duff finds voluntary 
gladiatorial contests unacceptable because of the “dehumanization or degradation 
perpetrated by the gladiators on each other, and by the spectators on the gladiators and on 
themselves.”255 
251 Wright, supra note 20, at 1399.  Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 759, 770 (2000), Dubber, supra note 18, at 568 (opining that criminal harm is “harm to a 
person, and harm to a person's very personhood, as opposed to his morally irrelevant attributes, such as his 
social dignity); Duff, supra note 20, at 13, 39-44 (referring to the harm as violation of humanity). 
 
252 See Wright, supra note 20, at 1399; Dan-Cohen, supra note 249, at 777-78.  See also Dubber, supra note 
19, at 567-68 (arguing that personal autonomy includes dignity, and that the concept of criminal harm 
should be based on protection of a person rather than a state). 
 
253 See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989). 
 
254 Dan-Cohen supra note 249, at 770. Dan-Cohen defines dignity as “an expressive value demanding that 
people's behavior, physical and verbal, convey a certain attitude to other people, namely an attitude of 
respect.”  Id. at 771. 
 
255 Duff, supra note 20, at 39. 
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I agree with both Dan-Cohen and Duff that certain degrading behavior may be 
harmful, even though it does not violate the victim’s rights.256 Society may be concerned 
about human dignity even in cases, in which a prohibitory norm does not originate in a 
rights violation, such as experiments involving fresh cadavers as “crash dummies”257 or 
pieces of art made with body parts of dead fetuses.258 
Moreover, no matter how respectfully Armin Meiwes treated his victim,259 
cannibalism by its very terms denies people equal moral worth, and thus assaults the 
victim’s dignity.  The concept of dignity, therefore, does not refer to the subjective state 
of mind of the perpetrator or the victim but has an “objective” meaning.  
Where should society look for this meaning?  Dan-Cohen suggests that the 
meaning of dignity ought to be determined by deference to a community in which the 
nominally criminal act occurred.  In this regard, he criticizes the court which, in People v. 
Samuels, has convicted the defendant for a sadomasochistic beating of his partner.260 
Dan-Cohen argues that, since violence does not have a meaning of disrespect in the 
sadomasochistic community, Samuels should have been acquitted.261 
256 See id. at 38-39, 42 (arguing that a dehumanizing act may be criminalized only if it is a “public” rather 
than “private” wrong, i.e. such that concerns “the whole political community as a kind of wrong that should 
(in principle) be publicly condemned by the criminal law”). 
 
257 Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS CENTER. REP. 31, 31-32 (1985). 
 
258 See Seagull Body and Fetus Head, POOR MOJO NEWSWIRE, August 30, 2005 (observing that a sculpture 
made with the pickled head of a dead fetus attached to a seagull’s body has fueled a furor in Switzerland 
about the boundaries of art), available at http://www.poormojo.org/pmjadaily/archives/2005_08.html. 
 
259 See discussion supra, notes 1-6 and the accompanying text. 
 
260 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
 
261 Dan-Cohen, supra note 249, at 777 (“Acquitting Samuels could, accordingly, be an expression of the 
court's deference to a community other than its own and to a meaning the court does not share.”).   
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This approach appears flawed.   Following Dan-Cohen’s logic, we would have to 
allow voluntary crucifixions, similar to the ones practiced in the Philippines, because the 
person who volunteers for the ritual is treated with the utmost respect in his religious 
community.  What about cannibalism?  According to German investigators, there are 
hundreds of people interested in cannibalism in Europe.262 Should we defer to them for 
the ethical meaning of cannibalism? 
Dan-Cohen answers these questions in the negative.  According to him, we may 
be able to do both – accept the meaning that is assigned to a particular act by a cultural 
group, and give the act moral assessment based on our own moral views.263 Thus, we 
may criticize and outlaw female circumcision even though it does not mean indignity to 
women in those communities in which it is practiced.264 I doubt that this method adds 
much to our understanding of dignity though.  If we are to use dignity as an objective 
moral criterion, it should not matter how a degrading act is perceived by the perpetrator, 
the victim or their neighbors.  And conversely, if, as Dan-Cohen maintains, Samuels 
should have been acquitted, it is not because pain does not mean indignity in the 
sadomasochistic community; it may only be because, in general, pain does not 
necessarily mean indignity. 
In my view, the “harm to dignity,” not accompanied by a rights violation, should 
be limited to the treatment that denies the victim the basic respect to which every person 
is entitled just by virtue of being a human being, no matter where he lives or to what 
 
262 Cook, supra, note 3, at 17. 
 
263 See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 164 (2002). 
 
264 Id. 
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cultural group he belongs.265 To be morally convincing, this understanding of dignity has 
to be shared by the community at large, not merely some of its segments.   
Furthermore, we should recognize that, every time we use the “dignity” argument 
to criminalize consensual behavior, we override an individual’s liberty – partly   
paternalistically but mostly for the benefit of society at large.  Therefore, as with any 
imposition on individual liberty, the threat to society should be serious enough to warrant 
the use of criminal sanctions.  For example, it is not unreasonable to believe that “The 
Fear Factor,” a popular television reality show, violates its participants’ dignity;266 
however, the magnitude and nature of the personal or societal harm involved are 
insufficient to justify a criminal ban. 
The foregoing discussion illustrates several points.  Perhaps the most important 
among them is that we need a broader theory of harm than the one based entirely on 
rights.  Criminal law should protect human dignity and other aspects of humanity, not 
merely autonomy.267 As Duff has convincingly argued, the reason we criminalize 
 
265 I agree with Markus Dubber that only moral dignity, or dignity of personhood, as opposed to social 
dignity, or dignity or rank, should be protected by criminal law.  See Dubber, supra note 18, at 567.  
Distinguishing the two kinds of dignity, Dubber explains: 
Social dignity is not only hierarchical and relative. It is also nonessential; it can be gained 
and lost, at least in a society that permits social mobility upward and downward. . . .  
Moral dignity, by contrast, is an essential characteristic of all persons as such. It is a 
necessary attribute of individuals who satisfy the minimum requirements of personhood. 
Whoever qualifies for personhood enjoys human dignity for that reason, and that reason 
alone. 
 Id. at 535. 
 
Meir Dan-Cohen makes a similar point when he observes that the term “dignity” should be understood as 
“moral worth” and not “social status.”  See DAN-COHEN, supra note 263 at 169, n. 23. 
 
266 As one journalist commented, “Do we really need to see people buried under 400 rats, each biting the 
exposed body parts of the desperate contestants? No.  And it doesn't get any more palatable when someone 
yells out, ‘Keep your butt cheeks clenched!’”  Tim Goodman, Reality TV hits a tailspin with NBC's 'Fear 
Factor THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 11, 2001 at E1. 
 
267 See Duff, supra note 20, at 44. 
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violations of autonomy is because we view autonomy as an essential aspect of 
humanity.268 
But if we then recognize the inadequacy of a Kantian conception of humanity, 
which focuses only on our autonomy as formally rational beings, and develop a 
richer conception that does justice to the morally significant aspects of our nature 
as social, embodied and impassioned beings, we will see that there are more ways 
to deny or radically fail to respect humanity than by violating autonomy. We will 
then also see that we therefore have good reason – reason of the same kind as we 
have to criminalize violations of autonomy – to criminalize other modes of 
conduct that deny or radically fail to respect the humanity of those against or on 
whom they are perpetrated.269 
Developing such theory is far beyond the goals of this article.  A few thoughts, however, 
may be relevant for the theory of consent advocated here.   
Conceptually, a rights violation is a wrongful setback to an interest.270 Traditional 
criminal theory protects most essential welfare interests from wrongful interference by 
others, where “wrongfulness” is understood as violation of autonomy.271 In my view, the 
concept that requires revision, in order to reflect a broader meaning of harm, is the 
concept of wrongfulness:  what we find morally objectionable is not only disregarding 
one’s will but also rejecting one’s human dignity. 
If we include violation of dignity in the concept of “wrong,” then harm can 
continue to be defined as a wrongful setback to an interest, where “wrongful” means 
either (i) such as violates a right (i.e. autonomy), or (ii) such as violates the victim’s 
dignity.  The two kinds of harm would include the same evil – objectification of another 
 
268 Id. 
269 Id.  
 
270 HARM TO OTHERS supra note 174, at 34, 144.  See also Stewart, supra note 240, at 65-66 (proposing to 
redefine harm as a set-back to interests). 
 
271 Id. at 62 (explaining that criminal law protects “welfare interests of the most vital kind.”). 
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human being, which may happen through a rights violation (e.g., murder) or, 
alternatively, through a setback to interests combined with the disregard of the victim’s 
dignity (e.g., consensual deadly torture).  
A setback to interests alone (e.g., due to a successful competitor) or disrespect to 
dignity alone (e.g., during a “Fear Factor”-like competition) should not be criminalized.  I 
am underscoring this point in order to express a concern in connection with the practical 
application of dignity-related arguments.  It is only to be expected that such a broad and 
politically charged concept as human dignity would cause profound disagreement among 
people.272 To avoid over-criminalization yet capture the kind of harm most of us would 
want to ban despite its consensual nature, I suggest that disregard of one’s dignity should 
be criminalized only if it is combined with a setback to interests protected by criminal 
law.273 
Based on this broader theory of harm, two kinds of conduct should be prosecuted. 
One is a violation of rights protected by criminal law, regardless of any additional 
setback to interests.  As an example, consider Gilbert v. State of Florida,274 in which a 
75-year-old old man was convicted of a first-degree murder for shooting his wife.   
Roswell and Emily Gilbert had been married for 51 years.  For the last few years 
of her life, Emily was suffering from osteoporosis and Alzheimer’s disease, and her 
 
272 For instance, Dan-Cohen and Duff seem to have opposite views on whether sadomasochistic activities 
deny participants their dignity.  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 249, at 777 (maintaining that sadomasochistic 
beating does not mean disrespect to the victim); Duff, supra note 20, at 41-43 (observing that 
sadomasochistic activities of R. v. Brown dehumanize and degrade its participants). 
 
273 Here, and throughout the article, I am talking only about situations that do not provide grounds for 
criminalization pursuant to the “offense to others” rationale.  See generally, OFFENSE TO OTHERS supra 
note 132.  
 
274 487 So. 2d 1185 (4th Dist. 1986). 
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condition was rapidly deteriorating.  Testifying at his trial, Roswell Gilbert tried to 
explain the killing:  “there she was in pain and all this confusion and I guess if I got cold 
as icewater that’s what had happened. I thought to myself, I’ve got to do it . . . I’ve got to 
end her suffering . . ..”  Roswell admitted that Emily had never asked him to kill her.275 
As dramatic and sad as this case is, the appellate court was right to affirm the 
defendant’s conviction.  Even though he was motivated by compassion and desire to 
protect his wife’s dignity and, in fact, did everything to make her death as painless as 
possible,276 she did not consent to being killed.  An unauthorized mercy killing of an 
autonomous human being is, and should be, murder.  No one has the right to decide for 
another person that his life is not worth living.     
The second kind of harm that should be criminalized under the broader theory of 
harm outlined above happens when an important interest normally protected by criminal 
law is set back in a way that denies the victim his equal moral worth.  For example, by 
killing Brandes, Meiwes did not violate the former’s right to life.  However, he not only 
defeated the most essential interest of Brandes (his interest in continued living) but also 
used Brandes as an object, a means of obtaining a desired experience, and thus 
disregarded his dignity.  
One other point may be worth making.  All criminal offenses are wrongful by 
definition.  Either violation of rights or setback to interests combined with disrespect to 
the victim’s dignity should be sufficient for criminal prosecution.  However, to be fair, 
the law should distinguish the relative wrongfulness of an act, which depends on the 
 
275 Id. at 1188. 
 
276 Id. (explaining that he used a gun because it causes instantaneous death).     
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importance of the affected rights,277 the extent of a setback to an interest,278 and the 
seriousness of failure to respect the victim’s dignity.  For example, theft is a serious 
offense that violates the victim’s property rights and sets back his interests (the larger the 
amount, the more substantial is the setback).  However, it is not as serious as, say, rape, 
which not only violates a more essential personal interest and the corresponding right in 
physical and sexual inviolability but also involves the indignity of using the victim as an 
object, and not a subject, of sexual intercourse.  Accordingly, the rapist deserves a more 
severe punishment than a thief.  And a thief who stole $100,000 deserves a more severe 
punishment than a thief who stole $100. 
 C.  Consent as a Partial Justification. 
 
The conclusions of the previous two sections allow us to place consensual 
physical harm within two paradigms – the paradigm of consent and the paradigm of 
harm.  Since valid consent eliminates violation of rights, the only instance, in which we 
should criminalize consensual injury or death, is when it both sets back victims’ essential 
interests and violates their dignity.  At the same time, we now know that consent in cases 
of consensual injury or death may play only an exculpatory role.   
What follows is that, in order to be entitled to a full defense, the perpetrator has to 
prove that the prima facie criminal violation did not in fact set back the victim’s essential 
interests or did not violate his dignity in a way that may hurt society at large.  This 
proposal is very commonsensical:  if no welfare interests protected by criminal law are at 
 
277 For an interesting discussion of different degrees of “stringency” of rights, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L.REV. 45, 51-58 (1977). 
 
278 For example, according to Feinberg’s typology, interests may be “set back,” “defeated,” “thwarted” and 
“impeded.”  E.g., to “set back an interest is to reverse its course, turn it away, put it back toward the point 
from which it started. ”  HARM TO OTHERS supra note 174, at 53). 
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stake, the mere violation of dignity is most likely a private thing, in which society has no 
business to interfere (e.g., sexual role-playing that involves humiliation of one partner).  
If, on the other hand, people’s dignity is not violated, there is no reason to disregard their 
autonomy, i.e. not to let them make important, even if hurtful, personal choices.  
Let’s start with the supposition that the defendant has failed this task.  Does that 
mean that the victim’s consent has no impact on his culpability?  In this Section, I argue 
that, even in that case, the defendant should be entitled to partial justification.  Partial 
justification does not make a wrongful act right; it merely renders the act less wrongful 
compared to what it would have been in the absence of the mitigating circumstance (in 
our case, consent).279 
Take a lifeboat scenario, in which all will die, unless a few sacrifice their lives by 
jumping overboard.  Assume that the necessary number of people has volunteered but, 
for whatever reason (say, they are too weak to be able to move), they cannot complete the 
suicidal act on their own.  Would it be wrong to push them off?  I agree with Michael 
Moore that, even if it would, it would certainly be less wrong than drowning those who 
have not volunteered.280 
Why would this consensual killing be less wrongful?  Now that we have briefly 
reviewed various kinds of harm, we can answer this question.  This is so mainly because, 
compared to an identical non-consensual act, the consensual killing would not involve a 
certain kind of harm, namely, violation of rights.281 It was the victims’ choice to sacrifice 
 
279 Husak, supra note 223, at 170.  
 
280 See MOORE supra note 20, at 708. 
 
281 It is also plausible that a consensual act causes less indignity because it at least respects the victim’s 
autonomy. 
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their lives; therefore, the victims are to a large degree responsible for the harm.  
Accordingly, the perpetrator has brought about less harm than in a non-consensual act 
and thus deserves a lesser punishment. 
 The idea that a less harmful act deserves a lesser punishment, although not 
universally accepted,282 has strong support in both our law and our morality.283 We 
decide whether people deserve praise or penalty based, in part, on the end results of their 
actions.  A sprinter who almost won the race does not deserve the same medal as the 
sprinter who, in fact, came first.  Similarly, a driver who almost hit a pedestrian does not 
deserve the same punishment as a driver who did, in fact, hit and kill someone. 
 Many criminal law doctrines implicitly or explicitly draw on the moral significance 
of harm.  For example, the defense of necessity presumes that the actor has violated a 
legal (and often moral) norm.  Yet, he may be completely absolved of criminal liability if 
the prima facie offense was committed in order to avoid a greater harm or evil.284 If the 
amount of the resulting harm did not affect the wrongfulness of an act, the actor who has 
made the right choice and, say, saved the lives of several mountaineers by breaking into a 
 
282 See, e.g., Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 65, 70 (1999). [hereinafter Victims and Retribution](arguing that “it’s not culpability alone that 
counts in determining desert. . . .  Rather, the amount of harm caused determines the seriousness of the 
wrong done, and the amount of wrong done does affect desert”). The opposing school of thought maintains 
that the amount of harm is irrelevant to the perpetrator’s desert.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 126, at 131 
(“Why should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for 
punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?”). The debate over the moral 
and legal significance of the resulting harm has a long history and still continues.  For the insightful 
analysis of advocated positions on both sides of the debate, see, e.g., MOORE supra note 20, at 191-247. 
 283 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
679, 701 (1994).  Kadish has conceded that 
 
While in principle it’s difficult to find good reasons for making desert turn on chance, 
here’s the rub: most of us do in fact make judgments precisely of this kind.  Doesn’t it 
seem natural for a parent to want to punish her child more for spilling his milk than for 
almost spilling it, more for running the family car into a wall than for almost doing so?   
Id. at 688.      
 284 See, e.g., MPC  § 3.02. 
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deserted house would not be justified in what he did. 
The moral significance of harm makes the attribution of harm essential to the idea 
of fair punishment.285 In a non-consensual act, the perpetrator bears full responsibility 
for the harm.  When the act is consensual, however, the victim shares the responsibility, 
and the perpetrator’s criminal liability should reflect that.   
In fact, the victim’s consent or participation is already taken into account at the 
sentencing stage of the criminal trial.286 The victim’s consent to homicide is a mitigating 
factor for capital sentencing purposes in twenty-three of the thirty-two death penalty 
jurisdictions listing statutory mitigating factors.287 The MPC comments that, in the 
situation of a mercy killing, “the defendant’s homicidal act may not have occurred had 
the victim not consented to it.  [In that case], the conduct of the victim in bringing about 
his own death deserves consideration as a mitigating factor in assigning a death 
sentence.”288 
However, reducing the role of consent to a sentencing mitigator is unwarranted:  a 
consideration that changes the very wrongfulness of an act should be taken into account 
at all stages of a criminal trial.289 If consent of the victim is legally valid, the actor should 
 
285 Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (“If a jury is to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral 
culpability and blameworthiness, one essential consideration should be the extent of the harm caused by the 
defendant”). 
 
286 Presently, twenty-three states and the federal government recognize the victim’s participation in the 
crime or consent to the criminal conduct as a mitigating factor.  See Bergelson, supra note 124, at 436. 
 
287 See James R. Acker & Charles Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy:  Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital 
Punishment Law, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 299, 320-21 (1994).  See also Bergelson, supra note 124, at 437-38, n. 
191 and the accompanying text. 
 
288 MPC § 210.6 cmt. 6(b) at 140-141. 
 
289 See Bergelson supra note 124, at 430-39 (discussing why the victim’s actions should be considered at 
the guilt adjudication stage and not merely at the sentencing stage).  See also Kyron Huigens, Rethinking 
the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1250-52 (2000) (explaining the difference between the “fault 
and the “eligibility” mitigators). 
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be entitled to at least a partial justification, which should result in conviction of a lesser 
offense, not merely a milder punishment.290 
D.  Consent as a Complete Justification: a “Good Reason” to Cause Harm 
Assuming the valid consent of the victim provides partial justification (which, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, may or may not significantly affect the 
perpetrator’s punishment),291 how much more is required for full justification?  To 
answer this question, we need to provide a plausible rationale for criminalizing 
consensual injury.  We already know the kind of evil we want to prevent – a setback to 
essential interests combined with a substantial offense to dignity. 
 Certainly, human dignity and ability to pursue one’s life plans are important 
values on personal as well as societal levels.  However, if the reason for criminalizing 
consensual harm stemmed only from the desire to promote those values, we would 
continue to prosecute a person who has attempted to commit a suicide or severely 
tortured himself.  The fact that we do not punish self-dehumanizing and self-destructive 
acts, yet punish identical acts when they are done by another person, suggests that the 
real moral difference lies in the involvement of that other person.  That supposition 
brings us back to the theory of rights and the role of consent.   
To have a right means to have a certain moral status.  Consent is a way to 
unilaterally change this status by transferring to another person a claim, a privilege, a 
power or an immunity.292 For example, by promising a colleague to read his piece, I give 
 
290 See Vera Bergelson, Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs, 8 BUFF. CRIM L. R. 567, 594-97 
(discussing practical implementation of the proposed mitigation of offenses). 
 
291 See discussion in the last paragraph of Section II.B.
292 See THOMSON, supra note 241, at 360-61. 
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him a claim against me with regard to that promise.  By consenting to a surgery, I give 
the physician a privilege to perform it.  By telling my daughter that she may do whatever 
she wants with an extra copy of Harry Potter, I give her a power to do so.   
In all those instances I waive a right I used to have and give other people rights 
they did not have before.  My consent or promise does not impose any obligations on 
them; it merely provides them with an option.  Even when I combine my waiver of rights 
with a request, these other people still have no duty to follow it.  For example, I may 
request (and simultaneously consent to) a surgery.  If my doctor does not believe I need 
one or does not want to perform it himself, he is under no duty to do so.  In other words, 
my consent or even request creates a very weak content-independent reason for action, 
compared to, say, threats or orders of an authority.293 
When a child breaks a rule, we demand:  “Why did you do that?”  This is a 
question about a moral reason for action and effectively about the availability of 
defenses.  What we want to know is whether the child had a good reason for violating a 
rule of conduct.  We are unlikely to accept “because such-and-such has asked me to” as a 
valid reason or defense. The classic parental reply to that would be:  “And what if he 
asked you to jump off the Brooklyn Bridge?”  By this reply, we in fact say:  “You are a 
free moral agent.  Why, being a free moral agent, have you chosen to break the rule 
(cause harm)?” 
 
293 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 177, at 413.  Based on Raz’s definition, a “reason is content-independent if 
there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason.  Id. at 35.  See also 
MOORE supra note 20, at 708-11 (discussing the victim’s assumption of risk as a consideration reducing 
wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s action). 
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The question about a “good reason” addresses both prongs of the evil we wanted 
to prevent by criminalizing consensual acts that set back important human interests and 
disregard victims’ dignity.  The “good reason” to hurt another must negate either kind of 
harm (since, as was discussed earlier, only the combination of the two harms warrants 
criminal sanctions for a consensual act) on the objective and subjective levels.294 
1.  The Objective Meaning of a “Good Reason” to Cause Harm. 
 
Generally, if the perpetrator’s actions do not violate rights and produce a positive 
balance of harms/evils and benefits, he is entitled to the defense of complete justification.  
For example, a mountaineer (A) who, in order to save the life of his friend (B) and with 
B’s consent, has cut off B’s leg would be completely exonerated from criminal liability.   
Similarly, a setback to the victim’s interests that protects the victim’s dignity 
should be justifiable.  For instance, a mercy killing of a suffering terminally ill patient 
certainly destroys his interest in continued living.  However, when based on the patient’s 
plea, such killing respects and preserves the dignity of the dying individual, and, 
therefore, should not be subject to criminal liability.295 That was the story behind 
Michigan v. Kevorkian,296 in which Dr. Kevorkian gave a lethal injection to a former 
racecar driver who, due to Lou Gehrig’s disease, was no longer able to move, eat or 
breathe on his own. Even the patient’s family has accepted his choice to escape the 
suffering and indignity of the slow demise.  But not the trial court or the appellate court:  
 
294 In addition, as has been discussed before, to qualify for either full or partial justification, (a) the harmful 
act must be based on legally sufficient consent, and (b) the perpetrator must be aware of that consent. See 
discussion supra, notes 103-25 and 199-02 and the accompanying text. 
 
295 See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (citing defendant’s unsuccessful 
claim that assisted suicide is the choice “crucial to one’s dignity, personhood, and autonomy”).   
 
296 248 Mich. App. 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
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the former has convicted Dr. Kevorkian of the second-degree murder, and the latter has 
affirmed the conviction.297 In my view, both decisions were erroneous.        
Naturally, the more serious (disabling and irreversible) is the impediment to the 
victim’s interests, the more serious must be the reason for the injurious action.  A 
sadomasochistic beating, which leaves no permanent damage, should be justified by the 
mere fact that its participants desired it.  Even those who believe that such beating 
violates the victim’s dignity would probably agree that it does not significantly affect the 
victim’s long-term interests.  On the other hand, it is hard to imagine any “good reason” 
that would justify a consensual deadly torture. 
If adopted by courts, this balancing test would significantly improve the current 
rule, which completely disregards both people’s reasons for harmful actions and the 
relative amount of harm, as soon as the injury reaches the threshold of being “serious.”  
The revised rule would be a step forward not only compared to the current U.S. law but 
also compared to the preliminary proposal of the Law Commission for England and 
Wales, which, to the disappointment of many, has merely raised the level of permissible 
injury by “one notch” instead of completely rejecting the quantitative approach to 
consensual harm.298 This new rule would promote individual privacy and liberty, while 
at the same time guarding society from frivolous abuse of people’s essential interests and 
dignity.      
I realize that it may be difficult sometimes to determine what qualifies as a “good 
reason” and to measure harm to interests or dignity against the benefits produced by an 
 
297 See id. at 443. 
 
298 See LCC 1994 Paper supra note 7, at 43; Roberts, supra note 8, at 253. 
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injurious act.  Yet there is little new in this task.  The justificatory defense of necessity is 
based on very similar considerations.299 In order to successfully claim that defense, the 
defendant has to establish that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by his conduct was 
greater than the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law he has breached.300 
In fact, practically all justification defenses have this “balance of evils” 
component to them.  For example, a target of a wrongful deadly attack may kill in self-
defense not merely because, if he does not, he himself may be killed, but also because he 
is “right” and the aggressor is “wrong.”301 By attacking an innocent person, the attacker 
loses moral parity with him.302 That is why the law prefers the life of an innocent person 
to the life of an aggressor and concludes, on balance, that the death of the aggressor is a 
lesser evil than the death of an innocent person. 
Similarly, consent of the victim may serve as a defense of justification only if the 
perpetrator’s act results in the objectively positive balance of harms/evils and benefits.  
For example, consensual gladiatorial matches are unacceptable not only because of the 
potential for death and injury (i.e., setback to the participants’ vital interests) and the 
indignity of turning human death into a show, but also because the benefits they produce 
(entertainment for the spectators and a chance to strike it rich for the participants) are 
 
299 See, e.g., MPC § 3.02(1)(“Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is 
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged”). 
 
300 Id. See also MPC § 3.02 cmt 2 at 12.  The comment explains that “the balancing of evils is not 
committed to the private judgment of the actor; it is an issue for determination at the trial.”  Id. 
301 If the target of the attack was also at fault, he may lose the right to use deadly force in return to a deadly 
attack either completely or until he satisfies certain rather onerous requirements (e.g., the initial aggressor 
has a heightened obligation to retreat).  See, e.g., MPC § 3.04(2)(b). 
 
302 See, e.g., SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE 
198 (1996) (suggesting that “the aggressor sacrifices something morally weighty when he becomes an 
unjust immediate threat; and if he does not forfeit the right to life itself, then he forfeits moral parity in 
respect of that right”).  
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quite frivolous compared to the quantity and quality of the harm involved.  In contrast, 
many advocate legalization of organ sale, since donation does not produce nearly enough 
needed organs.303 There is a sound argument that the setback to sellers’ health may be 
balanced by benefits purchased with the proceeds of the sale, and that the sellers’ dignity 
will not suffer more than in the currently legal sale of blood, sperm or ova.  At the same 
time, the benefit of saved human lives would add dignity to the transaction and, on 
balance, produce more good than evil. 
As is clear from the previous examples, the overall positive balance of 
harms/evils and benefits does not mean only the victim’s interests.  An act is justifiable if 
it produces an overall positive balance of harms/evils and benefits (to society or a third 
party or even the perpetrator) as long as the harm (i) is consensual and (ii) does not 
significantly set back the victim’s interests while, at the same time, disregarding his 
dignity.  Recall the lifeboat hypothetical in which volunteers who agreed to sacrifice their 
lives had to be pushed overboard.  I cited it as an example of at least partial justification.  
I would now argue that those who pushed the volunteers off the boat deserve not merely 
partial but complete justification:  they destroyed the victims’ interests in continued 
living but neither violated their rights nor disregarded their dignity, and, in addition, they 
saved numerous human lives, which otherwise would be lost.            
One might claim that, if an act produces a measurably positive outcome, that act 
is justified by the outcome alone, and consent of the victim is irrelevant. This claim is 
untrue.  If the victims in the lifeboat hypothetical did not volunteer, no number of saved 
 
303 See, e.g. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 69,  (2004) (observing that over a half of eighty-five thousand Americans 
waiting to receive kidneys, livers, hearts or other human organs will die while waiting).  
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lives would justify their killing.304 Moreover, even if the victim himself benefited from 
violation of his rights, the harm would not be justifiable.  If, say, B, the injured friend of 
the mountaineer A discussed in the beginning of this section, vehemently objected to the 
impromptu surgery, unwilling to take its risks and consequences, but A overpowered him 
and cut off his leg anyway, A would not be justified under the “balance of evils” defense.  
We penalize even medical doctors for operating on non-consenting patients, and medical 
doctors normally have a stronger claim than a layperson that violating a patient’s 
autonomy was a lesser evil than taking the risk that the patient’s condition may 
deteriorate.  Conceptually, this is so because hurting a conscious, rational person against 
his will constitutes an evil of such magnitude that it cannot be outweighed either by best 
intentions of the perpetrator or by the overall advancement of the victim’s interests. 
 2. The Subjective Meaning of a “Good Reason” to Cause Harm. 
 
An objectively justifiable outcome of a harmful consensual act is a precondition 
of the perpetrator’s justification, yet it is not enough.  In order to be completely 
exonerated, the perpetrator has to demonstrate more.  As we have already seen, the 
proper mens rea is essential for the availability of justification.305 The basis for this 
requirement, once again, may be explained by the limited scope and teleological nature of 
the defense:  we do not give people an open license to break rules and cause harm; we 
tolerate the harm, to the extent it is necessary to achieve the “lesser evil” outcome. 
 
304 See, e.g., R. v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), reprinted in [1881-1885] All. E.R. Rep. 61 
(holding the defense of necessity inapplicable in the case of non-consensual killing). 
 
305 See supra notes 199-202 and the accompanying text.  See also Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong 
Reason, supra note 192, at 320-21 (arguing that objective necessity is not enough for justification). 
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What should be the level of the perpetrator’s awareness of the justifying 
circumstances to deserve moral and legal justification?  There are grounds to believe that 
it should be purpose.306 For example, under the MPC, a person may not defend his life 
with deadly force if he provoked the attack “with the purpose of causing death or serious 
bodily harm”307 to the current attacker.  In comparison, an initial aggressor who did not 
have such a purpose still retains the right to use deadly force.308 An earlier wrongful 
purpose thus destroys the privilege of self-defense by putting a cloud on the current 
purpose for deadly actions.  That would not be the law if the subjective reason for one’s 
objectively justified actions were irrelevant.  
 Take another example:  suppose a person (A) hates his enemy (B) and wants him 
dead.  Knowing that B frequents a certain bar, A spends night after night outside the bar 
waiting for an occasion.  While he is waiting, he witnesses numerous fights, sexual 
assaults, even murders; however, he never interferes until finally one day he sees B 
attacking another patron (C) with deadly force.  Knowing the law of defense of 
another,309 A intervenes and kills B.  At his trial, A honestly tells his story of patience and 
determination.  Should he be rewarded for these qualities and completely exonerated, 
even though we know that he would not have defended C but for his desire to kill B?   
 
306 By purpose, I understand “a causally effective desire that is the actor’s actual reason for acting.”  See 
Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U.L. REV. 463, 544 (1992). 
 
307 See MPC § 3.04(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).  See also MPC § 3.04 cmt 4(b) at 51-52 (observing that an 
actor is deprived of the privilege of self-defense if he “provokes a struggle [with the] purpose that the 
outcome shall be the death of his victim or his serious bodily harm”). 
 
308 See MPC § 3.04(2)(B)(i).  See also MPC, § 3.04 cmt 4(b) at 50 (“Subsection 2(b)(i), depriving [the 
actor] of his justification on the ground of initial aggression, would not become operative unless [the actor] 
entered the encounter with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm.”). 
 
309 See, e.g., MPC §. 3.05. 
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I think most of us would view such acquittal as mockery of justice.  Justification 
defenses are not intended to provide people with convenient opportunities to commit 
crimes.  Any justifiable conduct requires good faith;310 and, in the context of a limited 
license to overstep the prohibitory norm, the good faith must include that the subjective 
purpose of the perpetrator be directed towards the goals for which that license is 
granted.311 
Furthermore, the “choice of evils” is not available as a defense against a negligent 
(or reckless) crime if the defendant was negligent (or reckless) in bringing about the 
situation that made the injurious choice necessary.312 Under this logic, should not a 
defendant who intentionally placed himself in a situation, in which he would be able to 
use the defense of another as a cover-up for intentional homicide, be denied the defense 
of justification? 
All these arguments support my view that, to qualify for the defense of 
justification, one must have both the knowledge of the justifying circumstance and a 
purpose specifically directed at it.313 Pursuant to this reasoning, self-defense or defense 
of another should require the knowledge as to the fact of the attack, its imminence and 
seriousness, and the purpose to protect oneself or another from that attack.  Similarly, the 
“balance of evils” defense should require the knowledge of a threat and the purpose to 
 
310 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 565 (arguing that justification is an exception to a prohibitory norm and, as 
such, should be available only to those who merit special treatment). 
 
311 In contrast, when consent plays an inculpatory role, the perpetrator is not required to act in good faith to 
avoid criminal liability.   
 
312 MPC § 3.02(2).  In a number of states, the rule is even stricter:  the defense of necessity is completely 
foreclosed for an actor who was at fault in bringing about the situation requiring the choice of harms or 
evils.  See MPC §3.02 cmt at 20 n. 27. 
 
313 MPC § 3.02 cmt. 2 at 12 (“It is not enough that the actor believes that his behavior possibly may be 
conducive to ameliorating certain evils; he must believe it ‘necessary’ to avoid the evils.”). 
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avoid it.  Here comes a question:  in order to use the victim’s consent as a defense, the 
perpetrator certainly should be aware of that consent but what should be his purpose?   
Fletcher suggests that it may be “fulfilling the desires of another person.”314 I
think that view is both under- and over-inclusive.  It is over-inclusive because fulfilling 
another person’s desires is not always necessary for a lawful yet harmful act.  For 
example, a boxing champ may use another as a sparring partner (punching bag) without 
focusing much on that person’s desires.   
At the same time, Fletcher’s proposition is under-inclusive.  As far as we know, 
Meiwes has dutifully fulfilled all Brandes’s desires.  He even managed to cook a part of 
Brandes’s body, satisfying the latter’s fancy of letting his killer “dine from [his] live 
body,”315 and shared the snack with his bleeding but still alive victim.  Yet Meiwes is 
hardly entitled to complete justification.   
What appears a better theory is that consent is related to other justification 
defenses on a slightly more abstract level: like other justifications, it requires subjective 
awareness of the necessary, permissive, conditions, and a “good reason” – the purpose to 
bring about a better balance of harms/evils and benefits than that which would exist 
without the perpetrator’s action.  Just as with the requirement of objectively positive 
outcome, this subjective purpose may include interests of other people and not merely the 
victim.  At the same time, similarly to the objective requirement for justification, the 
perpetrator may not aim at significantly setting back the victim’s interests while, at the 
same time, disregarding his dignity. 
 
314 Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason, supra note 192, at 320-21.  
 
315 Finn, Cannibal Case Grips Germany; Suspect Says Internet Correspondent Volunteered to Die, supra 
note 1, at A26. 
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This theory makes sense, both theoretically and practically.  From the theoretical 
perspective, it places consent squarely within the family of justification defenses.  All of 
them seek to overcome the deontological constraint against intentional infliction of harm.  
The ethical doctrine of double effect directed at the same moral constraint maintains, for 
instance, that an act that produces harm may be permissible if the harm is outweighed by 
good consequences and the harm is not directly intended.316 
Even those who do not subscribe to the doctrine of double effect would perhaps 
agree that there is a moral difference in choosing a certain course of action despite its 
negative effects as opposed to for the sake of its negative effects.317 Aiming at evil 
makes one more culpable.318 For example, killing, torturing, or disfiguring for the sheer 
joy of it is paradigmatic of true evil.319 In that sense, consensual killing, torturing or 
disfiguring for the sheer joy of it is not much different.  I concur with Thomas Nagel that, 
when a person volunteers to be subjected to some kind of pain or damage, either for his 
own good or for some other end which is important to him, the evil at which the 
perpetrator is constrained not to aim is “his victim’s evil, rather than just a particular bad 
thing.”320 Nagel’s observation corresponds with my claim that the evil criminal law 
 
316 THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 179 (1986). (“The principle says that to violate 
deontological constraints one must maltreat someone else intentionally.  The maltreatment must be 
something that one does or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather than something one's actions 
merely cause or fail to prevent but that one doesn't aim at.”). 
 
317 See, e.g., Antony Duff, Intention, Responsibility and Double Effect, 32 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 1, 
2-3 (1982). 
 
318 MOORE supra note 20, at 409 (“We are authors of evil when we aim to achieve it in a way we are not if 
we merely anticipate that evil coming about as a result of our actions.”). 
 
319 Id. at 408. 
 
320 See NAGEL supra note 312, at 182.  I do not completely agree with what Nagel argues further, i.e. that 
“each individual has considerable authority in defining what will count as harming him for the purpose of 
this restriction.”  Id. To be more accurate, I accept the individual’s limited authority to determine harm, as 
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should seek to prevent is objectification of another human being, which, in a consensual 
act, is a combination of significant setback to interests and violation of dignity. 
This test makes sense as a practical matter as well.  On the one hand, it requires 
the proof of the perpetrator’s good faith and benevolent purpose.  In that it is similar to 
other justification defenses; therefore, the requirement will not be new either to the 
general public or to the judiciary.  On the other hand, to be justified in a consensual 
harmful act, the defendant would not have to prove that his motivation was of a particular 
noble kind.   
Realistically, people seldom have just one motive for their actions.  Dr. 
Kevorkian, for instance, has admitted that his motive for killing the Lou Gehrig’s disease 
victim was “to relieve [his] pain and suffering and to bring the issue of euthanasia to the 
forefront.”321 Most of sadomasochistic encounters presumably are motivated by altruistic 
as well as egotistic feelings.  A surgeon who has agreed to perform a risky innovative 
surgery may be driven by compassion as well as intellectual curiosity and career 
ambitions. We may not like some of the perpetrator’s motives; however, as long as (i) the 
perpetrator intended to achieve, and in fact achieved, a positive “balance of evils,” and 
(ii) the consensual harmful act neither aimed at, nor resulted in, the substantial harm to 
the victim’s interests and dignity, the perpetrator should be justified.   
 
long as we are looking at the issue from purely moral perspective.  However, it is both impracticable and 
improper to construct criminal law on this basis.  Otherwise, using Leo Katz’s hypothetical, a criminal who 
followed his victim’s plea to kill her rather than rape would be right to claim that his punishment should be 
no greater than punishment for rape: after all, the victim herself preferred murder to rape, i.e., regarded it as 
a lesser evil.  See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 46 at 147. 
 
321 People v. Kevorkian, 248 Mich. App. at 443. 
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The corollary of this conclusion is a thesis that the perpetrator who cannot satisfy 
those requirements should be entitled only to partial justification.  More specifically, the 
perpetrator should not be completely justified if any of the following is true: 
(i) the harmful consensual act has brought about more bad than good (e.g., the 
euthanized patient was not in pain and had excellent prospects of recovery); 
(ii) the harmful consensual act has significantly set back the victim’s interests and 
dignity (e.g., the Meiwes-Brandes case of murder and cannibalism); 
(iii) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to bring about evil results (killing a 
consenting terminally ill patient out of sheer hatred for him and his family who will be 
broke when he dies); or 
(iv) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to set back significantly the victim’s 
interests and dignity (with the intent of injuring the victim’s body and self-esteem, hiring 
the victim for severe and humiliating beating).     
The first example is typically a case of a mistake of judgment.  Like any other 
mistake, that case should be treated as an instance of excuse and not justification.322 If 
the perpetrator’s mistake was reasonable, he should be completely exonerated from 
criminal punishment.  For members of the medical profession, it may be advisable to add 
a rebuttable presumption that when, in the course of consensual treatment, they cause 
pain or injury to their patients, they act appropriately and in the interests of those patients, 
i.e. to shift the burden of production with respect to any alleged wrongdoing to the 
prosecution.            
 
322 See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 124, at 404-06 (discussing why mistake should be a defense of excuse 
and not justification and citing conflicting views of the issue). 
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The second example involves the kind of harm which, as discussed above, should 
be prohibited by criminal law, irrespectively of the parties’ intentions and preferences.323 
The third and fourth examples involve situations in which the perpetrator’s 
reasons for causing consensual harm are malevolent.  Even if we assume that the 
perpetrator’s purpose was frustrated (e.g., in the third example, the terminally ill man was 
spared the suffering of his final days, and his family found a way out of financial trouble; 
and in the fourth example, the victim’s injuries were not particularly severe), still the 
malicious purpose, combined with the voluntary act, makes the perpetrator guilty.  In the 
third example, the perpetrator’s simply lacks a good reason necessary for justification:  
hatred does not justify intentional killing.   
In the last example (still assuming the frustration of purpose), the perpetrator’s 
wrongdoing is similar to an attempt.  In the case of an attempt, the perpetrator commits a 
wrongful act with a culpable state of mind but does not cause the social harm proscribed 
by the completed offense.  In an attempted murder, for instance, the perpetrator shoots 
with the purpose to kill but misses his victim.  His act is wrongful because its objective is 
to violate the rights of the victim:  people have a right not to be physically attacked 
without provocation.  Here, the perpetrator also commits a wrongful act with a culpable 
state of mind, namely, he beats the victim with the purpose of causing injury to the 
victim’s body and dignity.  This act does not violate the victim’s rights since it is 
consensual.  It is nevertheless wrongful under the advocated here theory of harm because 
its objective is to damage the victim’s essential welfare interests and dignity.  Due to the 
wrongfulness of his purpose, the perpetrator is not entitled to complete justification.  
Unlike in the case of attempt, the perpetrator in the last example does cause the social 
 
323 See discussion supra notes 252-77 and the accompanying text. 
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harm proscribed by the underlying offense, yet not all of the proscribed harm.  Thus, he 
is guilty of the completed, albeit mitigated, offense.  
Naturally, the extent of partial justification attributed to the victim’s consent 
should depend on the facts of each case and, at a minimum, reflect the importance of the 
victim’s interests (both harmed and intended to be harmed); the extent of the actual and 
intended damage to the victim’s interests and dignity; and the actual and intended balance 
of harms/evils and benefits.  In many instances, partial justification would reduce the 
perpetrator’s punishment to the minimal level.  In the third example, the perpetrator’s 
fault is not very significant:  he does not violate the victim’s dignity; and, while 
destroying the victim’s interest in continued living, he advances the victim’s interest in 
avoiding pain and suffering.  Due to his overall evil purpose, the perpetrator does not 
deserve full justification; yet, that does not mean he ought to be sent to jail.  Community 
service or its equivalent may be much more appropriate.  Conversely, the perpetrator in 
the second example is guilty of a serious wrongdoing, and his partial justification should 
not translate into the same mitigation of punishment as the partial defense in the third 
example.    
* * *
In this Part, I discussed what roles consent may play with respect to a criminal 
offense.  As my analysis shows, in the case of a bodily injury, that role is exculpatory.  It 
is exculpatory because, even when an injurious act does not merit punishment, it is still 
harmful and thus, unlike, say, consensual kissing, requires justification.  At the same 
time, a consensual act is always less harmful than an identical non-consensual act 
because the former does not involve one kind of harm included in a paradigmatic offense, 
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namely, rights violation.  For that reason, consent of the victim should always be at least 
a partial defense. 
In order to be entitled to a complete defense, the perpetrator has to establish that, 
in addition to the victim’s consent, he had a “good reason” for his harmful action:  he 
intended to achieve a better balance of harms/evils and benefits (compared to that which 
would result from his inaction) and, in fact, managed to achieve it.  That positive balance 
of harms/evils and benefits may include interests of people other than the victim as long 
as the perpetrator’s harmful act neither aims at nor actually harms both the victim’s 
essential welfare interests and his dignity. 
Instead of the current absolute rule, which recognizes consent to serious bodily 
harm only in a few circumstances, I propose a balancing test, which would take into 
account the severity of harm to the victim’s interests and dignity as well as the 
importance of the reasons that have prompted the perpetrator’s act.  The advocated 
approach would, on the one hand, give judges and jurors more freedom to balance 
relevant considerations and thus bring about more fine-tuned and fair decisions.  On the 
other hand, by limiting punishment only to cases of double injury to the victim’s interests 
and dignity, this approach would put an end to the prosecution of “harmless 
immoralities.”  Ultimately, the new rule would better reflect the goals of a free 
democratic society that respects the autonomy and dignity of its members.          
CONCLUSION 
Current criminal law does not recognize consent of the victim as a defense to 
bodily harm, except in a few historically defined circumstances.  That rule has been 
criticized in the United States and abroad for its arbitrary scope, outdated rationales, and 
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potential for moralistic manipulation.  Yet, despite those criticisms, no principled 
alternative has been worked out.  This Article is an attempt to outline a set of normative 
requirements for a new rule governing consensual bodily harm.   
It is hoped that the advocated rule will provide a basis for revising the law of 
consent.  Under the revised law, the victim’s consent to injury or death would function as 
an affirmative defense of complete or partial justification.  A complete defense would 
exonerate the perpetrator from any criminal liability, whereas a partial defense would 
only mitigate it.  In either case, the law would explicitly take into account the victim’s 
shared responsibility by reducing the perpetrator’s fault. 
The new rule would strike a good balance between private and public interests.  
On the one hand, by giving legal weight to self-regarding decisions of the victim, the rule 
would show respect to the autonomy of the victim as well as the perpetrator.  On the 
other hand, by protecting the victim’s dignity from most egregious harm, the rule would 
guard our collective interest in preserving humanity.  Overall, adopting a rule based on a 
uniform principle common to other justification defenses would lead to more fair, 
consistent and morally sustainable verdicts. 
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